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INTRODUCTION 1

Economic loss problems are contextual.2 Unfortunately, too
many economic loss cases use a doctrinal approach that ignores
context. Without a doubt, the construction industry cases are in
disarray. This Article analyzes the problem of claims for purely
economic loss in the construction industry and concludes that
courts should pay far greater attention to the commercial context
in which these problems arise.

1. This Article concludes the author's three-part series that underscores
the importance of context in analyzing risk allocation in the construction
industry. See generally Carl J. Circo, When Specialty Designs Cause Building

Disasters:Responsibility for Shared Architectural and Engineering Services,
84 NEB. L. REV. 162 (2005) [hereinafter Specialty Designs] (discussing liability
in specialty design construction contracts); Carl J. Circo, Contract Theory and
Contract Practice: Allocating Design Responsibility in the Construction
Industry, 58 FLA. L. REV. 561 (2006) [hereinafter Contract Theory] (examining
how courts and the construction industry determine liability under design
contracts).
2. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Economic Torts: Gains in Understanding
Losses, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 693, 701-04 (2006) (providing a brief discussion of the
importance of context-by-context analysis for economic loss cases); Dan B.
Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-Statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L.
REV. 713, 733 (2006) (stating that a single economic loss rule would create
illogical results due to the contextual nature of the claims); Mark P. Gergen,
The Ambit of Negligence Liability for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV.
749, 750-51 (2006) (detailing a system for determining when and why a person
is subject to liability for economic loss); Robert L. Rabin, Respecting
Boundaries and the Economic Loss Rule in Tort, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 857, 859,
869-70 (2006) (noting that the economic loss rule does not stem from a single
principle); Oscar S. Gray, Some Thoughts on The Economic Loss Rule and
Apportionment, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 897, 898 (2006) (referring not to a single
economic loss rule but to a broader concept that applies in distinct contexts).
The leading text on construction law also emphasizes the importance of
analyzing economic loss problems within the proper industry context. See
JUSTIN SWEET & MARC M. SCHNEIER, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE,

ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUCTION PROCESS, 289-90 (Thompson 7th ed.
2004) (examining the "commercial world" and the increasingly important role
of tort law in purely economic loss construction cases).
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Controversy,3 confusion,4 disagreement, 5 and even stinging
criticism' accompany economic loss problems in building
construction cases. Many cases purport to resolve these problems
by invoking the economic loss rule, a per se bar to recovery that
might be better confined to products liability law. The building
construction cases present a cafeteria of sumptuously conflicting
and ambiguous offerings. Pronouncements of state law on the
issue contrast mightily.' But it is not merely the jurisdictional
variations that manifest the debate's complexity. Conflicting cases

3. See, e.g., Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d
1349, 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) ("The economic loss rule is stated with
ease but applied with great difficulty."); Patricia H. Thompson & Christine
Dean, Continued Erosionof the Economic Loss Rule in ConstructionLitigation
by and Against Owners, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2005, at 36 (discussing the
difficult application of the economic loss doctrine "as it pertains to
noncontracual claims for economic damages" in the construction context).
4. See, e.g., Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 980 (Fla. 1999) ("We
must acknowledge that our pronouncements on the rule have not always been
clear and, accordingly, have been the subject of legitimate criticism and
commentary."); John J. Laubmeier, Demystifying Wisconsin's Economic Loss
Doctrine, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 225, 255-56 (discussing whether Wisconsin's
economic loss rule will ultimately be applied to residential real estate
purchases); Emily M. Usow, Redefining the Professional Service Contract: The
Evolution and Deconstruction of Florida'sEconomic Loss Rule, 8 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 1 (1999) (detailing the evolution of Florida law regarding the
economic loss rule).
5. See generally Anthony L. Meagher & Michael P. O'Day, Who Is Going to
Pay for My Impact? A Contractor's Ability to Sue Third Parties for Purely
Economic Loss, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Fall 2005, at 27, 29-31 (highlighting
conflicting reasoning of recent cases discussing the application of the economic
loss doctrine).
6. For example, in dissenting from the majority's opinion in Olson v.
Richard, 89 P.3d 31, 34 (Nev. 2004), allowing a residential purchaser to sue
for purely economic loss due to negligent construction, Justice Becker argued
that an opinion decided by the court only two years earlier established
definitively that Nevada law precluded just such a claim "and the fact that the
composition of the court has changed is not a sufficient reason for
reconsidering the issue." See also infra note 9 (citing dissenting opinions in
several economic loss cases).
7. Compare Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 378 A.2d 599, 602-03 (Conn.
1997) (refusing to extend implied warranty liability for economic loss to a
subsequent purchaser), with Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co., Inc., 342 N.E.2d
619, 620 (Ind. 1976) (extending economic loss based on an implied warranty to
a subsequent purchaser); compare Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Mfg. Co.,
384 S.E.2d 730, 737-38 (S.C. 1988) (holding that a builder may be liable to
subsequent residential purchasers for purely economic loss), with Casa Clara
Condo. Ass'n v. Charley Toppin & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993)
(reaching the opposite conclusion, finding a subsequent residential purchaser
may not sue the builder for negligent construction).
See also Jody
Bedenbaugh, Liability of Design Professional for Purely Economic Loss in
South Carolina, 53 S.C. L. REV. 701, 710-14 (2002) (contrasting Florida and
South Carolina cases applying the economic loss rule).
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often emerge within a single jurisdiction,' strenuous dissents9 and
heavily qualified concurrences abound,' ° and more than one high
court has reversed itself or awkwardly corrected course."
This Article argues that, in construction cases, the rule-based
debate over claims for purely economic loss should yield to more
significant construction law questions. Should a per se rule that
achieved its present vitality primarily because it efficiently limits
liability for defective products apply at all to defective building
design and construction? Does the economic loss conundrum merit
a revitalized legal perspective that recognizes the industry's
unique circumstances? If a claim seeks to reallocate a commercial
risk, should it matter whether the harm suffered includes a
physical as well as an economic consequence? If the resilient
building construction marketplace is left free to allocate
commercial and economic losses contractually, will it develop a
more efficient framework than tort law can ever hope to impose on
the industry?
The argument here is that courts should eschew a broad
brush approach to economic loss problems in favor of an inquiry
that considers the commercial context in which economic loss
problems arise in building construction cases. Courts sometimes
use the duty construct to frame the central policy issue of tort law.
With that approach in mind, the better question is not whether
tort law, viewed as a singular legal institution, should provide a
remedy for purely economic loss; it is whether or in what

8. See, e.g., Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 974-75 (addressing conflicting

opinions of the Florida District Courts of Appeal); Lempke v. Dagenais, 547
A.2d 290, 297-98 (N.H. 1988) (holding that subsequent purchasers may
recover economic loss in breach of implied warranty), overruling Ellis v.

Robert C. Morris, Inc., 513 A.2d 951 (N.H. 1986).
9. See, e.g., Bilt-Rite Contractors, Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d
270, 289-90 (Penn. 2005) (Cappy and Saylor, JJ., dissenting); Fireman's Fund

Ins. Co. v. SEC Donohue, Inc., 679 N.E.2d 1197, 1202 (Ill. 1997) (Heiple, J.,
dissenting); Floor Craft Floor Covering, Inc. v. Parma Cmty. Gen. Hosp. Ass'n,
560 N.E.2d 206, 213 (Ohio 1990) (Brown, J., dissenting); Sewell v. Gregory,
371 S.E.2d 82, 86-90 (W. Va. 1988) (Neely, J., dissenting); Cosmopolitan
Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1046-51 (Colo. 1983) (Ravira, J.,

dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Presnell Constr. Managers, Inc. v. EH Constr., LLC, 134
S.W.3d 575, 583-91 (Ky. 2004) (Keller, J., concurring) (explaining the
importance of the economic loss rule); Real Estate Mktg., Inc. v. Franz, 885
S.W.2d 921, 928, 929 (Ky. 1994) (Wintersheimer and Prater, JJ., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) (discussing diverging views on the requirement of
privity in economic loss cases across different jurisdictions).
11. See, e.g., Kennedy, 384 S.E.2d at 734-36, overruling Carolina Winds
Owners' Ass'n v. Joe Hardin Builders, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 897 (S.C. Ct. App.
1988); Gary Ashman, Note, The Long and Winding Road of Economic Loss
Doctrine in Calloway v. City of Reno, 3 NEv. L. J. 167 (2002) (recounting the
Nevada Supreme Court's reversal on the application of the economic loss rule
to residential construction).
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situations courts should impose a tort duty on those participating
in a building construction project to avoid causing purely economic
harm to others. The thesis of this Article is that a vigorous
economic loss defense best fits the construction industry context
because an efficient construction industry requires predictable and
quantifiable risk assessment to support risk allocation by contract.
To the extent that unequal bargaining power makes a contractual
approach unacceptable in some settings, such as residential
construction, legislatures rather than courts should craft a
solution equal to the problem.
Part II of this Article briefly reviews the economic loss
problem as a matter of tort law generally. Part III explores and
critiques how the courts have dealt with the most common theories
for recovering purely economic loss in building construction cases.
Part IV argues that the construction industry cases are incoherent
because they fail to place the debate in its proper industry context.
Part V outlines an alternative approach that would continue to
restrict tort recovery for commercial and economic losses in
building construction cases, while at the same time facilitate
recovery when justified on contract principles. Although this
Article mainly addresses the construction industry cases, the
recommendations made in Part V are also relevant to other
commercial and economic loss problems.
II. THE ECONOMIC Loss PROBLEM IN TORT LAW
A. Physical Harm and Economic Loss in Tort Law
As a conceptual matter, U.S. tort law distinguishes between
harm that has a physical dimension and harm that is solely
economic.12 Tort law does not, however, prohibit recovery for
economic loss. Although the torts with the oldest pedigrees, 3 such
as battery1 4 and trespass to property," involve harmful physical
12. Under the Restatement, physical harm refers to "physical impairment
of the human body or of real property or tangible personal property."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 4 (Proposed

Final Draft No. 1, 2005). The ongoing work on the Third Restatement of the
Law of Torts includes a now nearly-completed division dedicated exclusively to
torts involving physical harm that expressly reserves the topic of torts
involving only economic harm. Id., Introduction at xli-xlii (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979)
(restricting liability for "pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm" in
actions for negligent interference with contract).
13. The common law writ of trespass required direct physical contact with
the plaintiffs person or property. Later, the common law writ of trespass on
the case emerged and provided a potential remedy for harm resulting
indirectly from the defendant's conduct. See Charles 0. Gregory, Trespass to
Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 361-65 (1951).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965).
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contact, even the common law form of action for trespass on the
case sometimes provided a remedy for purely economic loss. 6
Additionally, tort remedies are routinely available to compensate
for economic loss suffered in conjunction with physical harm."
Contemporary tort law also comfortably affords remedies for
the intentional infliction of economic loss in a variety of contexts,
including fraud,18 intentional interference with another person's
performance of a contract,' 9 intentional interference with a
prospective contractual relationship," and intentional interference
with an inheritance or gift. 1 What is more pertinent to this
discussion is that several unintentional torts also protect economic
example,
negligent
interests.
These
include,
for
misrepresentation" and malpractice by accountants, 3 lawyers, 4
and other professionals."
In other circumstances, however, contemporary courts
routinely deny recovery in tort for the unintentional infliction of

15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).

16. See Chambers v. Spruce Lighting Co., 95 S.E. 192 (Va. 1918)
(concluding that if the plaintiffs could prove the amount of their lost profits
with reasonable certainty, they could recover in trespass on the case based on
the defendants' neglect of a duty imposed by law).
17. Courts frequently state the rule barring recovery for economic loss in
terms that make this clear. "We hold contract principles more appropriate
than tort principles for resolving economic loss without an accompanying
physical injury or property damage." Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1987).
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977) (providing liability
for fraudulent misrepresentation);
id. § 526 (describing when a
misrepresentation is fraudulent); id. § 527 (explaining when an ambiguous
representation constitutes fraud); id. § 529 (stating that an incomplete
representation may be fraudulent); id. § 530 (declaring that a
misrepresentation as to one's intentions or those of a third party may be
fraudulent); id. § 550 (establishing liability for fraudulent concealment).
19. See id. § 766A (establishing liability to a third party for the intentional
interference with the performance of a contract).
20. See id. § 766B (promulgating a rule that one who intentionally
interferes with another's prospective contract is liable to the other).
21. See id. § 774B (providing that one who intentionally interferes with
inheritance or gifts is subject to liability for the loss).
22. See id. § 552 (stating that one who negligently provides information for
the guidance of others can be liable for resulting pecuniary loss).
23. See Jodi B. Scherl, Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual
Third Parties:Balancing the Equities and Weighing the Consequences, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 255, 268 (1994).
24. See Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nonclient Third
Parties-At What Cost, 23 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 4 (1989).
25. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted
Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV.

1513,

1527 (1985)

(discussing economic loss in the context of "third-party situations in which the
victims are members of a general class who suffer economic loss as a
consequence of the defendant's carelessness").
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purely economic loss. 26 Courts and commentators frequently refer
to the economic loss rule or the economic loss doctrine as an
overarching principle. 7 Outside of products liability law, however,
the cases lack coherence on matters such as the scope, function,
and rationale of any principle dealing with purely economic loss.
A brief historical overview shows that early opinions denying
recovery for purely economic loss did not instinctively connect the
validity of a tort cause of action with the classification of the harm
as either physical or economic. Leading cases decided in the first
half of the twentieth century seem blind to the distinction between
They resolved economic loss
physical and economic harm.
devices, including proximate
to
other
resorting
by
problems
3°
Some early cases blended views on
cause, privity, and duty.
in
ways that seem to blur rather than
notions
of
these
two or more
involved."
rationale
clarify the
Consider the 1903 case of a printing company that lost
production time when a builder working for a neighboring
business negligently damaged conduit for electric utility lines. 2

26. See, e.g., Town of Alma v. Azco Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d 1256, 1264 (Colo.
2000) (holding that a party suffering purely economic loss from a breach of
contract may not assert a tort claim); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Tank Co., 435
N.E.2d 443, 450-52 (Ill. 1982) (discussing case law precedent denying a tort
claim based on economic loss).
27. See, e.g., Bilt-Rite Contractors, 866 A.2d at 287-88 (referring
alternatively to the economic loss rule and the economic loss doctrine); BRW,
Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 71-73 (Colo. 2004) [hereinafter Dufficy]
(economic loss rule); Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259, 1261 (Nev. 2000)
[hereinafter Calloway II] (economic loss doctrine); Jim's Excavating Serv., Inc.
v. HKM Ass'n, 878 P.2d 248, 252 (Mont. 1994) (economic loss doctrine);
Kennedy, 384 S.E.2d at 736-37 (economic loss rule); Matthew W.
Gissendanner, Tort Recovery for Defective Products Posing a Threat of Bodily
Harm: An Exception to the Economic Loss Rule?, 57 S.C. L. REV. 619 (2006)
(economic loss rule); see also John D. Finerty, Jr. & Charles J. Crueger, A
Commentary On The Economic Loss Doctrine Under The Rule Of Cease
Electric And Cascade Stone, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 137, 137 (2005) (economic loss
doctrine). I refer to the principle involved as a rule rather than a doctrine
primarily because selecting one term over the other serves the interest of
consistency. One might also suggest that the status of doctrine seems a bit too
elevated for something as uncertain in its scope and application as the
observation that in most jurisdictions tort law sometimes precludes recovery
for economic loss. Id.
28. See, e.g., Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 269 (N.J. 1945). See
generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 92-96 (2003); Fleming

James Jr. & Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L. J. 761, 763 (1951).
29. See Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 421 (Ga. 1903). See generally Scherl,
supra note 23, at 265-70 (discussing the historical development of the law of
contractual privity).
30. See, e.g., H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898-99
(N.Y. 1928).

31. See, e.g., Rickards, 41 A.2d at 268.
32. Byrd, 43 S.E. at 421.
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The company could not recover from the builder for the lost
business. "It is only the proximate injury that the law endeavors
to compensate."33 The negligent act did not damage the plaintiffs
property because the conduits belonged to the utility.
The
plaintiffs loss resulted because the damage to the lines inside the
conduit made it temporarily impossible for the utility to deliver
electricity to the plaintiff.
Under these circumstances, the
plaintiffs tort theory would lead to results the court viewed as
patently absurd. That theory could make the builder liable
"without limit to the number of persons who might recover on
account of the injury done to the property of the company owning
the conduits."34 Because the plaintiffs legal right to electricity
derived from the contract with the utility (a relationship that did
not involve the builder), recovery for the plaintiffs losses from the
power interruption could be had from the utility alone, and then
only if and to the extent the plaintiff could establish an actionable
breach of the service contract.
In part, the holding combines
proximate cause and privity reasoning, but the case may also
suggest the less theoretical rationale that courts must establish
some practical limits on tort liability.
Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,3 a 1927 United States
Supreme Court case, is sometimes cited as early authority for a
broad rule against recovery in a negligence action for purely
economic loss. 37 In that case, a ship owner hired a dry dock
company, which negligently damaged the ship while it was docked.
The Court held that the plaintiff who chartered the ship from the
owner could not recover from the dry dock company for the
resulting delay for repairs. The controlling statement of tort law
offered by Justice Holmes is a narrow principle, not expressly tied
to the economic character of the loss. Justice Holmes explained
that "as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of
one man does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely
because the injured person was under a contract with that other
33. Id. at 421. Although the analysis suggests a restrictive view of
proximate cause, the court expressly held that the successful defense theory
was distinct from the builder's alternative defense based on a proximate cause
argument. Id.
34. Id. at 420.
35. Id. Based on the court's summary of the petition, it seems that even in
those early days of the commercial use of electricity the utility had the
foresight to include in its service contract an express provision that exonerated
it under these circumstances. Id.
36. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
37. See, e.g., Local Joint Executive Bd., Culinary Workers Union, Local No.
226 v. Stern, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 1982) (holding that the common law rule
still applies and that absent privity of contract or "injury," a plaintiff may not
recover); People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 109
(N.J. 1985) (discussing a per se rule barring recovery for economic loss unless
the conduct was negligent and resulted in physical harm).
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unknown to the doer of the wrong. The law does not spread its
protection so far."3"
A 1945 New Jersey case held that a barge company could not
be liable to business owners for profits lost when the company's
pilot negligently damaged a draw bridge that provided the only
road access onto the island where the businesses were located.39
The opinion draws on more or less equal doses of duty, proximate
cause, foreseability, and a general concern for maintaining
sensible limits on the reach of tort liability.4 °
The role of privity of contract in restricting tort remedies
deserves special mention. Some early cases involving economic
loss stumbled on the privity requirement, which has now lost
much of its vigor in tort law. 41 By requiring privity, the courts
eliminated tort remedies in many situations in which only an
indirect nexus existed between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiffs loss, whether physical" or economic.' Privity does not
involve the nature of the harm suffered; rather it looks for a
legally significant nexus or relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant. Privity is a slippery and sometimes malleable
concept, but for present purposes Justice Pound captured its
essence when he suggested in a 1927 case that the evidence must
show that the plaintiff is someone to whom the defendant "is
bound by some relation of duty, arising out of public calling,
contract or otherwise.""
While the courts in the first half of the twentieth century were
applying notions of privity, proximate cause, and duty to economic
loss cases, they were also engaged in the more significant process
of defining tort law.'
In that process, the underlying concepts
most useful in controlling tort liability for economic loss were

38. Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 309 (citation omitted).
39. Rickards, 41 A.2d at 268.
40. Id. at 268-70.
41. See, e.g., Kennedy, 384 S.E.2d at 736 (affirming that privity of contract
is no longer necessary when bringing a cause of action for breach of an implied

warranty).
42. See, e.g., Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.2d 253, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (applying
restrictive privity and proximate cause notions to bar recovery from a steel
contractor for the death of a patron caused by the structural collapse of the
building). Perhaps the most famous case imposing privity as a condition to
recovery for physical harm is Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & W. 109, 152
Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
43. See, e.g., Byrd, 43 S.E. at 419 (holding that the plaintiff could not
recover damages from defendant for lost business because there was no privity
of contract between the parties).

44. Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 157 N.E.
272, 273 (N.Y. 1927).

45. It may be more accurate to say that the courts at that time were
creating Tort'as a distinct branch of law. See WHITE, supra note 28, at 3-19.
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transforming in ways that required the courts to rethink the
economic loss problem.
B. Expanding Tort Liability for Economic Loss
Glanzer v. Shepard,46 a Cardozo opinion decided in 1922,
molded the analytic framework that still governs many economic
torts today. The court held that defendants engaged by a seller to
certify bean weight could be liable to the buyer in tort for the
buyer's overpayment based on the defendants' erroneous
certificate. Relying on the nascent products liability precedent of
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,47 the Court of Appeals rejected
rigid limitations dependent on a direct contractual relationship or
privity and opted for a broader concept of tort duty arising from
the specific situation.
In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing was the
assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose
conduct was to be governed. We do not need to state the duty in
terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has
none the less an origin not exclusively contractual. Given the
contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law. 48
In other words, an obligation undertaken via a contract
between A and B can create a relationship between B and C that
generates sufficient public interest to convince a court to impose a
duty on B for C's protection. Using a contractually created
obligation to justify an additional legal duty, theoretically
independent of the contract, became a significant building block
for expanding the tort system.4 9
The significance of this
remarkable development for the construction industry will soon
become clear.' But first it is important to see how the doctrine of
Glanzer v. Shepard took root in other situations.
One of the most influential opinions expanding tort liability
for purely economic loss came a generation later in Biakanja v.
Irving."' In that case, the California Supreme Court allowed an
action by an intended will beneficiary who suffered loss because a
notary public improperly drafted the will. The court cited the
products liability cases and related developments in tort law to

46. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
47. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
48. Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276.
49. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1527-28 (discussing economic loss recovery
in situations where the defendant's negligence injured a third party). On the
significance of Glanzer v. Shepard to the development of the law generally, see
WHITE, supra note 28, at 131-32.
50. See infra Part III.B (explaining how recovery for a third party harmed
by a defendant's negligence expanded into recovery for negligent infliction of
economic harm in the construction industry).

51. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
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support a "greatly liberalized" privity of contract rule.5" The case
famously advanced the transition of tort analysis from the rigid
principles prevailing at the beginning of the century to a broader,
policy-based inquiry that weighed a range of relevant
considerations and that placed a special emphasis on
foreseeability.53
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of preventing
future harm.54
Borrowing logic and phrase from Glanzer v. Sheppard, the court
held that this progressive approach justified a theory for the
intended beneficiary because "the 'end and aim' of the transaction
was to provide for the testamentary devise to the plaintiff.""
Contemporary tort cases frequently apply the Biakanja factors
when the question is whether liability should extend to a situation
of first impression.56
Just over a decade later, the California Supreme Court
carried the analysis to the limits of logic. Chief Justice Traynor's
opinion for a 4-3 majority held that a savings and loan association
could be liable in negligence to purchasers of defectively
constructed homes the defendant financed. 7 Traynor held that
the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to permit a finding that
the defendant's sloppy loan underwriting practices violated the
standard of care it owed to its shareholders." Then, applying the
Biakanja factors, Traynor held that the lender "was clearly under
a duty to the buyers of the homes to exercise reasonable care to
5 9
protect them from damages caused by major structural defects."
As in the earlier opinions expanding tort liability for purely
economic loss, the influence of products liability theory figured
52. Id. at 18.
53. For a general discussion of the impact of Biakanja v. Irving, see Rabin,
supra note 25, at 1518-21.
54. Biakanja,320 P.2d at 19.

55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Colbert v. B.F. Carvin Const. Co., 600 So. 2d 719, 725 (La. Ct.
App. 1992); Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73, 81-82 (Mo. 1967).
57. Connor v. Great W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609, 617 (Cal. 1969).
58. Id. at 616-17. The majority rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the
developer and the lender were joint venturers. Id. at 615-16. The degree of
involvement and control the lender exercised over the lender, however, played

a role in several of the Biakanja factors. Id. at 617-18.
59. Id. at 617.
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prominently. "At least since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. there
has been a steady expansion of liability for harm caused by the
failure of defendants to exercise reasonable care to protect others
from reasonably foreseeable risks." ° Other courts have not been
as eager to carry this expansion as far as Traynor was, at least not
in the context of a lender's liability for construction defects."' In
dissent, Justice Burke highlighted the logical flaw in Traynor's
analysis by substituting a similarly careless individual lender for
the savings and loan association. "In that situation could it be
said that the individual's failure to exercise prudence and care in
himself gives rise to a duty of care to others? I think
protecting
, 62
not.
In People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,3
decided more than twenty-five years after Biakanja v. Irving, the
New Jersey Supreme Court turned a spotlight on the growing
perception that courts should restrict negligence law to cases
involving physical harm.
This appeal presents a question that has not previously been
directly considered: whether a defendant's negligent conduct that
interferes with a plaintiffs business resulting in purely economic
losses, unaccompanied by property damage or personal injury, is
compensable in tort. The appeal poses this issue in the context of
the defendants' alleged negligence that caused a dangerous chemical
to escape from a railway tank car, resulting in the evacuation from
the surrounding area of persons whose safety and health were
threatened. The plaintiff, a commercial airline, was forced to
evacuate its premises and suffered an interruption of its business
operations with resultant economic losses.6
Unlike the courts in Glanzer v. Sheppard and Biakanja v.
Irving, the New Jersey Supreme Court was not satisfied to address
the broad questions of privity, proximate cause, duty,
foreseeability, and the logical limits of tort liability. The court
launched a frontal attack on any bright-line restriction against
recovery in tort for economic loss. The court judged this assault
necessary because "a virtually per se rule barring recovery for
economic loss unless the negligent conduct also caused physical

60. Id. at 619 (citations omitted).
61. "[T]he Connor rule has not met with widespread acceptance...
subsequent cases have indicated that liability will only be imposed in unusual
circumstances where the lender's activities clearly exceed those of a normal
lender." Smith v. Tyonek Timber, Inc., 680 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Ala. 1984); see
also Melissa Cassedy, The Doctrine of Lender Liability, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 165,
173-77 (1988) (illustrating the narrow interpretation other courts have given
the Connorrule).
62. Connor, 447 P.2d at 626.
63. 495 A.2d 107 (N.J. 1985).
64. Id. at 108.
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harm has evolved throughout this century."6 That predicate for
the opinion is more surprising than the court's holding that the
plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of action. The authorities the
court cited for this per se rule do not, either individually or
collectively, evidence an established, broad-based judicial hostility
to purely economic loss as a category of harm as much as they
reflect the judicial instinct that some consequences of negligence
are either too remote or too widespread for an orderly tort system
to address.'
Having thus posited the existence of a per se rule evolved over
the century, the court then cited numerous cases decided during
that same period that permitted recovery of purely economic loss.'
From this cast of cases, the court reasoned that a per se rule
should be rejected in favor of a case-by-case approach turning on
foreseeability and the policy considerations inherent in defining
the concepts of duty and the limits of tort liability.' The court
could have conserved much judicial energy by drawing a more
direct inference from all of the cases cited: A century of torts cases,

65. Id. at 109.
66. As direct support for its claim that a "virtually per se bar" has evolved,
the court cited Robins Dry Dock and Byrd, both of which are discussed in Part
II.A of this Article. People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at 109. The court also
cited Stevenson v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946). Id.
The Stevenson court held that that the plaintiff could not recover for lost
wages caused by a gas explosion at the defendant's plant that ignited such a
large fire in the vicinity that the plaintiff was unable to work at his employer's
nearby place of business until eight days after the explosion. Stevenson, 73
N.E.2d at 204. While the concluding language in Stevenson, when read in
isolation, suggests a per se bias against purely economic loss claims, the case
is probably better understood as simply a reaction against the unmanageable
judicial burden of providing a tort remedy for every remote consequence of a
negligent act. Id. at 203-04. "[T]he principal reason that has motivated the
courts in denying recovery in this class of cases is that to permit recovery of
damages in such cases would open the door to a mass of litigation...." Id. at
203. In other words, one can read the case not as announcing an economic loss
rule, but as using the rationale of Robins Dry Dock to set practical limits when
negligence results in a condition, such as a fire, that could produce extensive,
free-standing economic damage that is traceable, yet remote. The People
Express Airlines court also cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C
(1979), which is not a broad rule prohibiting recovery for purely economic loss,
but a far narrower rule that applies only to the tort of negligent interference
with contract or prospective contractual relation. The only other cited case is
Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 Q.B. 453 (1875), which held, on
proximate cause grounds, that a tunnel contractor could not recover from a
water company for interference and delay of the project resulting from damage
that water pipes caused to land owned by the contractor's employer. Cattle, 10
Q.B. at 457. In short, the cases cited do not support the New Jersey court's
claim of a "virtually per se rule" that "has evolved throughout this century."
People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at 109.
67. People Express Airlines, 495 A.2d at 112-18.
68. Id. at 116, 118.
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whether or not involving physical harm, shows an imperfect
progression from the dominance of rigid liability principles to more
flexible standards that balance factors such as those recognized in
Glanzer v. Sheppard and Biakanja v. Irving. In this sense,
perhaps People Express overreacts. Even if that is so, the case
helps set the stage for an enduring battle between those who
believe that tort policy can police itself and those who argue for a
bright line to mark the outer limits of tort liability.
While many other cases have contributed to the expansion of
tort liability for purely economic loss,69 the cases discussed here
adequately demonstrate the phenomenon for these introductory
purposes. As Part III will show, Glanzer v. Sheppard and
Biakanja v. Irving have played an especially important role in
developing
the
professional
negligence
and
negligent
misrepresentation theories for recovering purely economic loss in
building construction cases. A review of the construction cases,
however, must await one further aspect of the economic loss
problem in tort law generally. The grand development of tort law
that expanded into matters of economic as well as physical harm
predictably produced judicial concern over the potentially
unlimited reach of tort. That concern led to one development that
has been especially influential in the construction industry cases the economic loss rule of products liability law.
C. EstablishingLimits on Recovery for Economic Loss
Given the importance of products liability in expanding tort
remedies, it is not surprising that construction industry cases
often draw on products liability law for guidance in establishing
liability limits."0 Not surprising, but it is unfortunate. The
extraordinary developments that yielded products liability law
reflect uniquely irresistible forces of scholarly opinion and public
policy in reaction to the widely perceived risks of dangerous
products manufactured and marketed on a mass basis.71 The
enterprise liability theory that eventually evolved now efficiently
shifts many costs of those risks to the manufacturing industry.
69. See Eileen Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss, 32
U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403 (1999).
70. See, e.g., Azco Constr., 10 P.3d at 1259-64; Floor Craft, 560 N.E.2d at
208; Malta Constr. Co. v. Henningson, Durham & Richardson, 694 F. Supp.
902, 906 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
71. See generally WHITE, supra note 28, at 168-72 (attributing the
expansive development of products liability law to the policy agendas of
leading scholars and appellate judges of the time); George L. Priest, The
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual
Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 465-505 (1985)
(discussing the "conceptual revolution" in American jurisprudence, including
the development of products liability case law supporting recovery in spite of
the economic loss rule).
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But a theory based on such a broad social policy itself admits no
logical limit. Is every enterprise to bear all associated costs?
Should the law treat all commercial enterprises equally?
To maintain balance, most jurisdictions have embraced some
form of an economic loss bar as a sensible limit in products
liability cases. 2 The rationale of the products liability cases,
however, does not a priori apply with equal force to other instances
of expanded tort theory. Indeed, one of this Article's major
arguments is that the courts facing economic loss claims in
building construction cases should not adopt or adapt the economic
loss rule of products liability law. But, as Part III demonstrates,
the construction industry cases have in fact relied heavily on both
the language and justifications of products liability's economic loss
rule. For that reason, an overview of how the products liability
cases have dealt with purely economic loss is an essential prelude
to a review of the building construction cases.
Although Chief Justice Traynor's opinion in Seely v. White
Motor Co.73 is the seminal authority for the economic loss rule in
products liability cases, the United States Supreme Court's East
River opinion74 may offer the most powerful articulation of the
principle involved. As a preliminary matter, the Court held that
federal admiralty law "incorporates principles of products liability,
including strict liability."" In light of the deference that many
building construction cases give to the economic loss rule of
products liability law, several excerpts from Justice Blackmun's
opinion merit reflection. He began by recognizing both the policy
justification for products liability law and the potentially
unlimited reach it portended. In a concise overview, Blackmun
tipped his hat equally to Traynor's influence and Professor Grant
Gilmore's wit.
Products liability grew out of a public policy judgment that people
need more protection from dangerous products than is afforded by
the law of warranty. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 15,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21, 403 P.2d 145, 149 (1965). It is clear, however,
that if this development were allowed to progress too far, contract
law would drown in a sea of tort. See G. Gilmore, The Death of
Contract 87-94 (1974). We must determine whether a commercial
product injuring itself is the kind of harm against which public
policy requires manufacturers to protect, independent of any
contractual obligation.

72. See generally E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476
U.S. 858, 868-70 (1986) [hereinafter East River]; Gissendanner, supra note 27,
at 619.
73. 403 P.2d 145 (Cal. 1965).
74. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).

75. Id. at 860.
76. Id. at 866 (internal citations omitted).
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The opinion continued with the obligatory acknowledgment of
Justice Cardozo's role, along with a well placed citation to a
famously prescient Traynor concurrence.
The paradigmatic products-liability action is one where a product
"reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril," distributed
without reinspection, causes bodily injury. See, e.g., MacPherson v.
Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 289, 111 N.E. 1050, 1051, 1053
(1916). The manufacturer is liable whether or not it is negligent
because "public policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and
health inherent in defective products that reach the market. Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24
7 Cal.2d at 462, 150 P.2d at
441 (opinion concurring in judgment)."
Next, Blackmun approached the crux of the matter before the
Court.
For similar reasons of safety, the manufacturer's duty of care was
broadened to include protection against property damage. Such
damage is considered so akin to personal injury that the two are
treated alike.
In the traditional "property damage" cases, the defective product
damages other property. In this case, there was no damage to
"other" property. Rather, the first, second, and third counts allege
designed turbine components
that each supertanker's defectively
78
damaged only the turbine itself.
On the crucial question of purely economic loss, the state
courts offered conflicting conclusions. On one side stood the
majority of the courts, which followed Seely v. White's
determination to halt enterprise liability at purely economic loss,
based on the rationale that "preserving a proper role for the law of
warranty precludes imposing tort liability if a defective product
causes purely monetary harm."79 At the other end of the spectrum,
a minority of courts preferred the rule "that a manufacturer's duty
to make nondefective products encompasse [s] injury to the product
itself, whether or not the defect created an unreasonable risk of
harm."' The leading case in support of this position was Santor v.
A & M Karagheusian,Inc.,"1 decided by the New Jersey Supreme
recovery for economic
Court, whose resistance to a per se bar to
82
loss has already been noted in this Article.
77. Id. at 866-67.
78. Id. at 867 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 868.
80. Id. at 868-69.
81. 207 A.2d 305, 312-313 (N.J. 1965), overruled by Alloway v. Gen. Marine
Indus., 695 A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997).
82. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text (reviewing the New
Jersey court's position that recovery for purely economic loss should be
allowed in products liability cases).
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Blackmun sided with Traynor. His rationale balanced the
common factors that appear in countless opinions that seek
sensible limits to expanding tort liability. First is judicial respect
for contractual risk allocation. Contract no less than tort holds a
place in the panoply of social policy. The opinion sounded this
theme even before it considered the contrasting approaches of the
state courts and the lower federal courts. "Obviously, damage to a
product itself has certain attributes of a products-liability claim.
But the injury suffered - the failure of the product to function
properly - is the essence of a warranty action, through which a
contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain."'
Later, the opinion returned to the contract-tort distinction, but
this time adding an instinctive call for limits on nonconsensual
liability. "The minority view fails to account for the need to keep
products liability and contract law in separate spheres and to
maintain realistic limitation on damages."'
The opinion next considered whether the policy reasons
supporting products liability extend to purely economic loss.
When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort
duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual
remedies are strong.
The tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the
product itself

....

[W]hen a product injures itself, the commercial

user stands to lose the value of the product, risks the displeasure of
its customers who find that the product does not meet their needs,
or, as in this case, experiences increased costs in performing a
service. Losses like these can be insured. Society need not presume
that a customer needs special protection. The increased cost to the
public that would result from holding a manufacturer liable in tort
for injury to the product itself is not justified.
Damage to a product itself is most naturally understood as a
warranty claim. Such damage means simply that the product has
not met the customer's expectations, or, in other words, that the
customer

has received

"insufficient product

value.

.

."

The

maintenance of product value and quality is precisely the purpose of
express and implied warranties ....
Contract law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to
commercial controversies of the sort involved in this case because
the parties may set the terms of their own agreements. The
manufacturer can restrict its liability, within limits, by disclaiming
warranties or limiting remedies. In exchange, the purchaser pays
less for the product. Since a commercial situation generally does not

83. East River, 476 U.S. at 867-68.
84. Id. at 870-71.
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involve large disparities in bargaining power, we see no reason to
intrude into the parties' allocation of risk.
After this extended discussion primarily concerned with the
distinct roles of contract and tort in our legal system, the opinion
turned more directly to another theme courts commonly consider
in cases of purely economic loss - on what basis to draw the line
when courts impose liability as a matter of policy. It is significant
that Blackmun did not speak of overarching principles of tort law,
but only of policy considerations specific to manufacturing
enterprises.
In products-liability law, where there is a duty to the public
generally, foreseeability is an inadequate brake.... Permitting
recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could
make a manufacturer liable for vast sums. It would be difficult for a
manufacturer to take into account the expectations of persons
downstream who may encounter its product. In this case, for
example, if the charterers - already one step removed from the
transaction - were permitted to recover their economic losses, then
the companies that subchartered the ships might claim their
economic losses from the delays, and the charterers' customers also
might claim their economic losses, and so on. "The law does not
spread its protection so far."6
The case held that, for purposes of products liability law as
incorporated into the general maritime law, "a manufacturer in a
commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or
strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring
itself." 7 Notice that the Court limited the holding to commercial
relationships involving manufactured goods. It did not announce a
broad principle about recovery of purely economic loss in tort
actions. Indeed, in a footnote that cited an influential Cardozo
opinion, the Court expressly reserved ruling on "the issue whether
a tort cause of action can ever be stated in admiralty when the
only damages sought are economic."'
The holding, therefore, is
limited to a specialized area of the law - products liability in a
commercial setting - and to a particular kind of economic loss injury to the product itself.

85. Id. at 871-73 (internal citations omitted).
86. Id. at 874.
87. Id. at 871.
88. Id. at 871 n.6. The Cardozo opinion referenced Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), which held that a creditor who relied on
inaccurate financial statements certified by the debtor's accountants could not
recover from the accountants on a negligence theory. The opinion's carefully
crafted limits on the liability theory of Glanzer v. Sheppard significantly
influenced professional malpractice and negligent misrepresentation law. See
generally WHITE, supra note 28, 131-36 (discussing Cardozo's reasoning in
both Ultramaresand Glanzer).
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The products liability cases that implement Seely and East
River offer the most prominent and highly developed response to
the economic loss problem. Moreover, as Part III will show, the
economic loss rule of the products liability cases has played a large
role in the still evolving judicial approach to economic loss
problems in the construction industry. The debate over the
economic loss problem, however, does not end with products
liability law or with the Supreme Court's decision in East River.
Beyond products liability law, the debate continues over the
circumstances under which tort law should compensate victims of
purely economic loss. 9
As Part II.B demonstrates, tort law
provides remedies for many economic torts, and it often does so
without articulating any doctrinal approach that is uniquely based
on the economic character of the injury involved. In his insightful
analysis written more than a generation ago, Professor Rabin
argued that the legitimate concern in tort cases over purely
economic loss derives not from some categorical distinction
between physical harm and purely economic harm, but from a
rational judicial fear of excessively widespread tort liability. 90 He
concluded that the source of "the sustained reluctance of the courts
to extend liability for economic loss" stems from "a deep
abhorrence to the notion of disproportionate penalties for wrongful
behavior."9
In other words, judicial common sense insists on
reasonable tort liability limits, but it does not necessarily insist
that tort law must treat economic harm differently from physical
harm.
There will be limits, of course; the law will not redress all
consequences of tortious conduct. The challenge is to establish
coherent limits. In the early era of expanding tort liability, Justice
Holmes could simply explain that at some point "[t]he law does not
spread its protection so far."92 In products liability law, the
majority of courts use the physical-economic distinction to set the
limits, yet even in East River, Justice Blackmun returned to
Holmes's less precise rationale.93
In other areas, the courts allow or deny recovery for purely
economic harm not by applying a bright-line rule, but because they
sense, to use Professor Rabin's analysis, that the claim seeks a
penalty disproportionate to the wrong. But can the courts
articulate
guidelines
for
principled
decisions
about
proportionality? Or, to invoke Justice Holmes's standard, can the

89. See Symposium, Dan B. Dobbs Conference on Economic Tort Law, 48
ARiz. L. REV. 693, 696-97 (2006); see also Usow, supra note 4, at 10-13;
Silverstein, supra note 69.
90. Rabin, supra note 25, at 1527-33.
91. Id. at 1534.
92. Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 309.
93. 476 U.S. at 874.
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courts explain how to identify when the claim seeks to spread the
law's protection too far? Parts III and IV will argue that the
courts have failed to develop a coherent approach to the economic
loss problem in building construction cases in part because,
whether permitting or denying recovery, they have adhered too
closely to a rule-based approach reflective of products liability law
and too little on the less well developed principles that apply to
economic harm in other areas of tort law.
The American Law Institute has recently turned its attention
the
economic harm problem as the topic of a new project for the
to
Restatement (Third) of Torts.' Perhaps the pending Restatement
will ultimately provide a coherent framework for analyzing
economic loss claims for all circumstances. But for now, at least
outside products liability law, the law offers no comprehensive
Under these
principles for limiting economic torts. 9
circumstances, the courts must operate more narrowly by asking
why tort law should or should not support recovery of purely
economic loss in specific contexts. In considering this question in
building construction cases, Part III.A briefly demonstrates the
confusion of the economic loss cases. The remainder of Part III
analyzes the most common legal theories for recovering purely
economic loss in the construction industry.

III. PATTERNS, THEORIES, AND EMERGING DISTINCTIONS
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CASES

A. The Obscure Hyperbole of the Economic
Loss Rule in Construction Cases
Although construction industry opinions and commentary
often refer to the economic loss rule,' it is impossible to distill
from the cases a consistent rule of national standing or even a
majority approach to the economic loss problem in the construction
industry setting. Although a legal principle governing purely
economic loss surely has achieved rule status under the products
liability law of most jurisdictions," its counterpart in construction

94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: ECON. TORTS & RELATED WRONGS
(Council Draft No. 1 2006). The preliminary work on the Restatement
promptly inspired a new wave of scholarly analysis about how tort law
addresses economic loss claims. See Symposium, supra note 89, at 694.
95. While the current literature offers no coherent jurisprudence of
economic harm, "it is undeniable that over the course of a century the courts
have come to attach particular significance to the problem of personal injury."
Rabin, supra note 25, at 1532.
96. See, e.g., infra notes 99-119 (identifying construction cases that cite the
economic loss rule).
97. See supra Part II.C (describing the development of the economic loss

rule and its application in the product liability context).
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law is doubtful, except in a few jurisdictions. 9' As demonstrateded
in the following subparts, the relevant authorities are too
inconsistent and incoherent to define reliable guidelines on the
issue.' What makes the situation even more confounding is that
courts ruling on economic loss claims in construction industry
cases sometimes issue rash proclamations either announcing or
denying that some version of an economic loss rule applies to
construction industry cases.
The Nevada Supreme Court deserves special mention for
conflicting and exaggerated principles concerning the economic
loss problem in the construction industry. Calloway v. City of
Reno' ° was a residential construction defect case that the court
decided in 2000.
The opinion comes after a 1998 order
withdrawing the court's 1997 opinion in the same appeal. The
1997 opinion held that, in certain circumstances, purchasers of
newly constructed homes may recover purely economic loss from
subcontractors responsible for negligent defects. 1' In its 2000
opinion, following a rehearing of the appeal, the court turned
about and held that the economic loss rule barred the claims. The
court relied on a products liability treatise for the sweeping
proposition that "there can be no recovery in tort for purely
economic losses."' ° Later in the opinion, the court reinforced this
categorical prohibition: "Purely economic losses fall outside the
0 3
purview of tort recovery, even if such losses are foreseeable."
Additionally, the court offered the unqualified declaration that
"the economic loss doctrine applies to construction defects cases."'
Taken literally, at least the first two statements are belied by the
well-established tort remedies for both the intentional and
negligent infliction of economic loss in certain circumstances. 0 5
Perhaps the Nevada court felt obliged to underscore its
ultimate holding in the case. Not only was it abandoning its 1997
opinion in the same appeal, but the new result overruled two
earlier cases" ° and disapproved what the court characterized as
98. See, e.g., Azco Constr., 10 P.3d at 1264 (articulating the Colorado
economic loss rule in a construction industry setting).
99. This problem is often recognized in the cases and literature. See, e.g.,
Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 980 (citing several inconsistent decisions); Thompson
& Dean, supra note 3 (discussing the current application of the economic loss

doctrine in the construction context).
100. 993 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 2000).
101. Calloway v. City of Reno, 939 P.2d 1020, 1025-26 (Nev. 1997)
[hereinafter Calloway 11 (per curiam), superseded by Calloway II, 993 P.2d at

1263.
102. Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1263.

103. Id. at 1270.
104. Id. at 1266.
105. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing tort recovery
available for intentional and negligent causation of economic loss).
106. Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1270-72, overruling Charlie Brown Constr. Co.
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One of the disapproved statements
dictum from two other cases."
announced that "the economic loss doctrine was never intended to
apply to construction projects . . . .""' One Justice filed a separate
opinion in the 2000 appeal concurring in part and dissenting in
part,"9 and the Chief Justice filed a separate dissenting opinion
that would have followed the cases disapproved by the majority.
"While our prior decisions in this area of the law are neither
consistent nor uniformly well reasoned, they do show a clear
reluctance to apply the economic loss doctrine to construction
defect cases and, in dicta, expressly state just that."1 0
A brief per curiam opinion issued by the Nevada Supreme
Court four years later offered a curious epilogue to Calloway."'
That case held that a homeowner could recover purely economic
loss attributable to negligent construction defects. True, the
opinion was based on the court's interpretation of a statute
enacted while the Calloway case was pending, but the court's
conclusion that the legislature must have meant the statute to
create a cause of action for negligent construction arguably goes
well beyond anything the legislation suggests. In a well-reasoned
dissenting opinion, one Justice argued that the statute did not
create a cause of action or otherwise affect the application of the
Nevada economic loss rule to construction cases and, the dissenter
quipped, "the fact that the composition of the court has changed is
not a sufficient reason for reconsidering the issue. " 1
The economic loss problem sometimes seems to trigger an
irresistible tendency toward hyperbole. One court initially limited
its bright line economic loss pronouncement to an extremely
narrow spectrum of cases: "The cases uniformly hold that a person
who sustains economic loss only cannot recover in damages from
persons whose negligent conduct damages bridges.""' That rule
was fully adequate to resolve the case before the court in which
business owners sued those allegedly responsible for defectively
constructing a bridge that provided access to the business
premises. But promptly after noting the consistent results of the

v. Boulder City, 797 P.2d 946 (Nev. 1990) and Worrell v. Barnes, 484 P.2d 573
(Nev. 1971).
107. Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1265, 1268, disapproving of Nat'l Union Fire
Ins. Co. v. Pratt & Whitney, 815 P.2d 601, 603 (Nev. 1991) and Oak Grove
Investors v. Bell & Gossett Co., 668 P.2d 1075, 1080 (Nev. 1983).
108. Nat'l Union Fire Ins., 815 P.2d at 603.
109. Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1272 (Maupin, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1277 (Rose, J., dissenting). See generally Ashman, supra note 11
(commenting on the Nevada Supreme Court's refusal to accept the application
of the economic loss rule to residential construction).
111. Olson, 89 P.3d 31.
112. Id. at 34 (Becker, J., dissenting).
113. Neb. Innkeepers, Inc. v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Corp., 345 N.W.2d 124,
126 (Iowa 1984).
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cases involving those specific circumstances, the court offered as
the controlling rationale the "well-established general rule" that "a
plaintiff who has suffered only economic loss due to another's
negligence has not been injured in a manner which is legally
cognizable or compensable." 14
Other cases also broadly declared a tort rule that
categorically bars recovery of purely economic loss." 5 The courts
commonly attribute the rule to the need for a bright line to mark
the boundary between tort and contract, 116 as if some primal force
requires such order in the legal universe. The cases have not
explained why, if this is so, our legal system comfortably tolerates
some torts either exclusively or primarily concerned with purely
economic loss.17
Other contrasting but equally broad pronouncements in
construction industry cases have rejected any rule against
recovery of purely economic loss at least in certain situations."'
Still other cases have denied the rule's application within a more
limited area of construction law. For example, a Rhode Island
case held that "the economic loss doctrine is not applicable to
consumer transactions."" 9 The issue before the court involved a
claim by a residential purchaser that an engineer had negligently
reported inaccurate soils data relied upon by the plaintiff.2 ° It is
unclear whether the court intended to limit the holding to
residential construction or to extend it to all consumer
transactions.
This short introductory essay on the literary aura of the
economic loss problem in construction cases illustrates the tension
between the soul of contemporary tort law, which yearns to
remedy wrongs, and the ever-present practical concern to establish
reasonable liability limits. Tort principles now aggressively afford
remedies for physical harm, but only haltingly do so for economic
harm. As noted, many of the cases insist that this must be so to
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Snow Flower Homeowners Ass'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 31 P.3d
576, 579-81 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
116. The most elegant articulation comes from East River: "It is clear,
however, that if this development were allowed to progress too far, contract
law would drown in a sea of tort." 476 U.S. at 866; see also infra Part III.B.2

(discussing the hypothetical boundary line that is drawn between tort and
contract law for construction cases).
117. See supra notes 15-24 and the accompanying text (discussing the
application of tort law for claims involving economic loss).
118. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cease Elec., Inc., 688 N.W.2d 462, 472
(Wis. 2004) (announcing a "bright line rule" that the economic loss rule is
inapplicable to claims for the negligent provision of services); Jim's Excavating
Serv., 878 P.2d at 252 (concluding that most jurisdictions "have rejected the

economic loss doctrine" in the construction industry setting).
119. Rousseau v. K.N. Constr., Inc., 727 A.2d 190, 193 (R.I. 1999).

120. Id. at 191-92.
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preserve the distinction between contract and tort. Whether or not
that argument is valid, it offers a convenient reminder of a critical
distinction: No economic loss problem in this same sense exists in
contract law. When the issue is contractual liability, the ancient
doctrine of Hadley v. Baxendale21 provides the limiting
mechanism, not as a bright-line rule, but as a judicially managed
concept of foreseeable damages.
In this environment, construction lawyers representing
clients who have suffered purely economic loss must first analyze
liability in reference to the available theories, knowing that some
courts will be skeptical of tort claims. What the balance of this
Part will show is that many cases recognize several viable
alternative theories to recover purely economic loss in construction
cases, and that a progressive level of sophistication (some might
say sophistry) emerges as these theories move away from breach of
contract to theories of tortious infliction of economic loss. As
Subparts B, C, and D explain, the primary theories include breach
of implied warranty, ordinary negligence, professional negligence,
negligent misrepresentation, and products liability.
Because purely economic loss is a problem of tort law, this
Article takes little note of breach of express contract cases, which,
if supported by the facts, afford the most direct remedies for purely
economic loss in construction cases. 2 For a different reason, this
Article has only a passing interest in the building construction
cases that adopt a products liability theory. Although some
products liability cases involving the construction industry are
noteworthy for their treatment of purely economic loss, 1 2 the
highly developed economic loss rule of products liability law has
been adequately addressed elsewhere. 124 It may be safely ignored
for present purposes except to the extent that it serves as a foil or
analogy in some of the cases discussed in the balance of this Part.
Professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation merit
distinct exploration, and Subparts C and D address those theories
in detail. For reasons that will soon be apparent, implied
warranty and ordinary negligence are best taken up together now.

121. 9 Exch. 341; 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
122. See, e.g., Follansbee Bros. Co. v. Garrett-Cromwell Eng'g Co., 48 Pa.
Super. 183, 190-91 (1911) (holding that, in an action for loss caused by faulty
construction, the plaintiff was permitted to present evidence that defendant
breached its contractual promise to provide furnace design plans similar to

those of two existing plants).
123. See, e.g., Snow Flower, 31 P.3d at 579-81; Commercial Distrib. Ctr., Inc.
v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 667 (Mont. Ct. App. 1985).
124. See generally Christopher Scott D'Angelo, The Economic Loss Doctrine:
Saving Contract Warranty Law From Drowning in a Sea of Torts, 26 U. TOL.
L. REV. 591 (1995).

2007]

Commercial and Economic Loss in the ConstructionContext

63

B. Negligence
1.

CarelessPerformance of ContractualActivity

Construction industry disputes normally involve economic
harm, which may or may not be accompanied by personal injury or
physical damage. While diverse and complex causes contribute to
construction disputes, some of the most common factors include
simple carelessness, inattention to detail, and the failure to follow
proper standards, methods, or techniques - that is, the lack of due
care in the performance of construction activities. Usually, one or
more contracts govern the activities involved.
Under what
circumstances should legal policy (as contrasted to private
contract) establish a remedy when those involved in building
construction inadvertently inflict economic harm?
When the claim is ordinary negligence, courts apply familiar
rules. "An action in negligence can be maintained when a plaintiff
shows that a defendant breached a duty of care owed to the
plaintiff and this breach proximately caused an injury to the
plaintiff resulting in actual damages."'25 Periodically, construction
industry cases test the limits of negligence policy, and the courts
invoke the expansionary concepts of contemporary tort law. Thus,
more than one court has invoked the Biakanja factors explicitly'26
or has applied a similarly expansive tort analysis 27 when
presented with what amounts to a claim for the negligent infliction
of economic harm arising from building construction. 2 8 But, as

125. Lutz Eng'g Co. v. Indus. Louvers, Inc., 585 A.2d 631, 635 (R.I. 1991); see
id. (holding that an architectural and engineering firm hired by the general
contractor owed no duty to review shop drawings for the protection of a
subcontractor).
126. See, e.g., Conforti & Eisele, Inc. v. John C. Morris Assocs., 418 A.2d
1290, 1292 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1980) (allowing the factors to be used in New
Jersey to determine liability); Westerhold, 419 S.W.2d at 81 (permitting the
indemnitor of surety not in privity to bring negligence suit after balancing the
factors).
127. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Bechtel, Inc., 631 F.2d 989, 999-1003 (D.C. Cir.
1980) (holding that consultant engineering firm's contractual control over
jobsite safety regulations created a special relationship between the firm and
plaintiffs employee under which the firm owed a duty to employee to protect
him from foreseeable risks).
128. See, e.g., Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Hosp., 454 So. 2d
496, 502-03 (Ala. 1984) (concluding that when a party reasonably relied upon
a contract between a contractor and a subcontractor, a negligence claim was
available against the subcontractor); Westerhold, 419 S.W.2d at 81 (holding
that the architect could be liable to the indemnitor of the contractor's surety
for payments made under the surety bond based on the architect's failure to
use ordinary care in certifying the amount of work completed and materials
supplied by the contractor); U.S. ex rel. Los Angeles Testing Lab. v. Rogers &
Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (holding that the federal court
should use California law and the Biakanja factors to determine negligence).
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Part II.B demonstrates, the courts have sometimes tamed theories
that threaten potentially unlimited liability by refusing to allow
plaintiffs to resort to tort theories to recover purely economic loss.
2.

The Contract-TortBoundary Metaphor in Construction Cases

Because contracts govern most construction activities,
contract doctrine may compete with tort doctrine when economic
harm claims arise in the construction industry. Some situations
aptly correspond to the contract-tort boundary metaphor that
courts and commentators frequently use to justify some form of an
economic loss bar in tort."9 For example, when residential
purchasers appealed the dismissal of their negligence suit against
the builder to recover damages for the repair or replacement of a
defective roof, a Georgia court required less than one hundred and
fifty words to rule, giving the crux of its legal analysis in only two
short sentences."' "Appellant simply sued for loss of the benefit of
his bargain. Such damages are not recoverable in negligence." 31
The logic of drawing an imaginary line between contract and
tort remedies is evident in many situations in which the plaintiff
and the defendant have entered into a contract relating to a
construction project.
Especially when one contracting party
asserts a tort claim to recover purely economic loss from the other
contracting party, it seems natural to ask whether the claim
improperly encroaches into contract territory. If, as a factual
matter, the plaintiff is suing for benefit-of-the-bargain damages
solely because the defendant breached the contract between the
two parties, there is no need to resort to tort law. 132 Not even the

129. "The economic loss doctrine marks the fundamental boundary between
contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the
parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby
encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others." Sidney R.
Barnett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for Construction Defects: A
Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 894 (1989); see also Prendiville v.
Contemporary Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257, 1259-60 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that the homeowner was barred from negligence recovery because the
harm was limited to the house itself); Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1265-66
(holding that townhouse owners could not sue for strict products liability
because townhouses were not "products"). Although the metaphor reflects the
rule-based preference of many cases, the principle involved is considerably
more circumspect. "We recognize, of course, that warranty and products
liability are not static bodies of law and may overlap ....Nonetheless, the
main currents of tort law run in different directions from those of contract and
warranty, and the latter seem to us far more appropriate for commercial
disputes of the kind involved here." East River, 476 U.S. at 873 n.8.
130. McClain v. Harveston, 263 S.E.2d 228, 228 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).
131. Id. (quoting from Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor, 234 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1977)).
132. See, e.g., Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1263 (holding that allowing a
homeowner to sue the builder for negligent construction "would essentially
nullify the express warranty agreed upon by the parties").
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geometric expansion of tort theory wrought by the past century of
case law repeals the rule that mere breach of contract is not a
tort'33 - there must be an independent duty.3 3
Tort liability
attaches to contract default only if the court concludes that the
default also breaches a duty imposed by law.135
The problem is more complex, however, than simply staking a
metaphorical boundary line between two legal constructs. Neither
contract nor tort provides fixed points of reference, and the same
conduct or circumstances may give rise to both contract remedies
and tort remedies. 1 6 Moreover, tort theories have expanded
phenomenally as courts have repeatedly elected to impose new
obligations that implement a progressive policy of protecting the
body politic from an increasing list of harmful risks found in the
human environment, sometimes including the risk of economic
harm.
Under
these
conditions,
construction
lawyers
now
instinctively look for alternative theories when a traditional
breach of contract action is either unavailable or inadequate for a
plaintiffs purposes. "Plaintiffs find a tort remedy attractive
because it often permits the recovery of greater damages than an
action on a contract and may avoid the conditions of a contract."'37
For example, the plaintiff may prefer a negligence theory if the
primary contractual basis of liability depends on an express
warranty that has expired'38 or the contractual warranty
provisions are limited. 39 In other situations, negligence theory
133. See, e.g., Thomson v. Epsey Huston & Assocs., Inc., 899 S.W.2d 415, 420
(Tex. App. 1995) (concluding there was no injury beyond the subject of the
contract itself); Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Island R.R., 516 N.E.2d 190,
193 (N.Y. 1987) ("It is a well established principle that a simple breach of
contract is not to be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the
contract itself has been violated.").
134. See supra notes 45-60 and accompanying text (explaining the
development of recovery for economic harm based on contractual and
judicially-created duties of care).
135. "Because of this contractual obligation to the owner, the architect owes
a further duty, sounding in tort, to the contractor who relies upon the design
to his economic detriment." Mayor & City Council v. Clark-Dietz & Assoc.
Eng'rs, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 610, 624 (N.D. Miss. 1982). See also Kennedy, 384
S.E.2d at 737.
136. "If a builder performs construction in such a way that he violates a
contractual duty only, then his liability is only contractual. If he acts in a way
as to violate a legal duty, however, his liability is both in contract and in tort."
Kennedy, 384 S.E.2d at 736.
137. Casa Clara,620 So.2d at 1245.
138. Azco Constr., 10 P.3d at 1258.
139. Compare Fla. Power & Light, 510 So.2d at 903 (holding that the owner
of a power plant could not recover repair costs under negligence theory from
designer and manufacturer of generators that leaked) with Commercial
Distrib. Ctr., 689 S.W.2d at 670 (determining that the owner of an
underground storage facility could recover in strict liability from a
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may support a claim against a target defendant with whom the
plaintiff has no contractual relationship, which may be especially
useful if the plaintiff is unlikely to recover from the contract
party " or if the plaintiff has already settled with the contract
Or the plaintiff
party for less than the total damages claimed.'
a
tort
theory" or
damages
under
may wish to pursue punitive
may decide to argue for strict liability 4in tort because evidence of a
defect is available but its cause is not. 3
3. Encroachingon the Boundary - Implied Warranty
For reasons that may already be obvious, the story of implied
warranty in construction cases is entwined with that of expanding
liability in negligence. Implied warranty lives in the twilight
So much so that, at least in
between contract and tort.
construction defect cases, the implied warranty and negligence
theories seem nearly redundant. It was on that basis that a
residential builder in a Colorado case argued that "a claim for
negligence against a builder is indistinguishable as a matter of
proof from a claim of breach of implied warranty of habitability."'"
The court disagreed, and it did so predictably by invoking the
arising-out-of-contract-but-distinct-from-contract doctrine that has
"An obligation to act
long been part of tort jurisprudence. '"
manufacturer and installer of metal brackets that failed and caused overhead
refrigeration components to collapse).
140. See, e.g., Olson, 89 P.3d at 32 (describing homeowners who asserted a
negligence claim against subcontractors after the builder ran out of money and
abandoned the project); E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Const. Co., 551 F.2d
1026, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1977) (detailing subcontractor's delay claims against
the contractor that were barred by an express limitation in the contract
between those parties could seek delay damages from the project architect on
a negligence theory).
141. See Berschauer/Phillips Constr. Co. v. Seattle School Dist. No. 2, 881
P.2d 986, 989 (Wash. 1994) [hereinafter Berschauer];Seattle W. Indus., Inc. v.
David A. Mowat Co., 750 P.2d 245, 248-49 (Wash. 1988) (holding that the
subcontractors' settlement agreements did not extinguish the designing
corporation's liability). Cf. Terlinde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768, 768-69 (S.C.
1980) (allowing the subsequent purchaser of a residence to sue the builder for
negligent construction for which the builder had already settled with the
original purchaser who sold the property to the plaintiff).
142. See F. D. Borkholder Co. v. Sandock, 413 N.E.2d 567, 570-71 (Ind.1980)
(affirming lower court's finding that the evidence supported the award of
punitive damages under various torts, including gross negligence).
143. See, e.g., Commercial Distrib. Ctr., 689 S.W.2d at 667-70 (finding
plaintiff could not establish which subcontractor was responsible for defect in
metal support brackets used in refrigeration system for underground
warehouse).
144. CosmopolitanHomes, 663 P.2d at 1042.
145. See, e.g., Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones &
Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88-89 (S.C. 1995) (holding that, even absent
privity of contract, a project engineer owed a duty to a contractor not to design
or supervise the project negligently); Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276 (holding that
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without negligence in the construction of a home is independent of
contractual obligations such as an implied warranty of
habitability."146 In an explanation that adheres closely to the
accepted doctrinal script, the court explained that, in the case of
residential construction, this independence does not deny the
obvious relationship between the obligation to avoid negligence in
the performance of the contract and the contractual obligation
itself. "A contractual obligation gives rise to a common law duty to
perform
the work subject to the contract with reasonable care and
1 47
skill."
This reasoning reflects an established tort principle, already
discussed in this Article" that empowers a court to tease a tort
duty from a contractual undertaking without violating the equally
fundamental principle that mere breach of contract cannot itself
be the basis of a tort claim. The underlying tort analysis is that a
contractual undertaking may create, in addition to the express
contractual arrangement, a legally distinct, special relationship
from which the law imposes on one of the contracting parties a
duty to act with reasonable care to avoid harming another (who
may either be the other contracting party or a stranger to the
contract). 149 Based on this legal alchemy, a court that imposes an
obligation on a builder by implying a warranty of habitability or a
warranty of sound construction is arguably engaged in contract
law policy, while a court that imposes an obligation on a builder to
avoid negligent defects is engaged in tort law policy. 5'
Courts have regularly implied a warranty of quality into
contracts for work or services. "' This is especially so with respect
the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs based on a contract
between the defendants and a third party).
146. Cosmopolitan Homes, 663 P.2d at 1042.
147. Id. at 1043.
148. See supraPart II.B (discussing the development of a tort-based recovery
for economic losses).
149. "Given the contract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law."
Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276. Cases establishing the tort of architectural
malpractice often used this analysis. See, e.g., Eveleth v. Ruble, 225 N.W.2d
521, 523-24 (Minn. 1974). See generally Note, Architectural Malpractice: A
Contract-Based Approach, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1075 (1979).
The same
justification regularly appears in construction industry cases in which a court
imposes liability for negligent performance of obligations that stem from a
contractual undertaking even though there is no privity of contract between
plaintiff and defendant. See, e.g., Griffin Plumbing & Heating, 463 S.E.2d at
88; Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 135-36.
150. See William K. Jones, Economic Losses Caused by Construction
Deficiencies: The Competing Regimes of Contractand Tort, 59 U. CIN. L. REV.
1051, 1059-60 (1991).
151. See, e.g., Zenda Grain & Supply Co. v. Farmland Ind., Inc., 894 P.2d
881, 890 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (implying into a contract for management
services a warranty to perform "skillfully, carefully, diligently, and in a
workmanlike manner"); Wawak v. Stewart, 449 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Ark. 1970)
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to residential construction, where the courts have implied
expansive warranties,15 although courts have also implied at least
a simple warranty of sound construction into commercial
contracts. 5 3 These implied warranty cases often provide an
adequate basis to award purely economic loss for construction
defects, but they cannot always do so gracefully. The most
common illustration of this theoretical problem involves the
liability of builders to those who purchase defective projects from
the original owners. The circumstances strain the contractual
roots of implied warranty theory when the property owner has no
contractual relationship with the builder or other prospective
defendant. To the extent that the implied warranty theory is a
matter of contract law, subsequent purchasers must convince a
court to imply a contractual obligation into a non-contractual
relationship. This looks like contract jurisprudence imitating tort
policy. Although many courts have taken that theoretical leap in
favor of subsequent 5purchasers,
especially for residential
4
consumers, not all have.1
4.

Crossing the Boundary - Defective Construction as Negligence

Negligence provides a natural alternative to implied
warranty. Subsequent purchasers who are disappointed with the
quality of construction are especially likely to assert a claim of
negligent construction. Because construction defects often cause
repair costs and diminished property values without physical
harm, negligent construction claims often attract the defense that
negligence is not a sufficient basis to recover purely economic loss.
A recent Arizona case 55 involved a negligent construction claim
brought by a business condominium owners' association. The
court held that Arizona's implied warranty of good workmanship
does not extend to a subsequent purchaser of a commercial
building and that the economic loss rule precludes a party from
(discussing a trend toward implying into a contract for construction and sale of
a new residence warranties "of inhabitability, sound workmanship, or proper

construction").
152. Hershewe v. Perkins, 102 S.W.3d 73, 75-76 (Mo. App. Ct. 2003)(holding
seller liable to home buyers under a theory of implied warranty); Centex
Homes v. Buecher, 95 S.W.3d 266, 273 (Tex. 2002) (explaining the distinction
in Texas between the implied warranty of habitability and the implied
warranty of good workmanship, which "recognizes that a new home builder
should perform with at least a minimal standard of care.").
153. See 3 PILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND
O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 9:67 (2002) (discussing common law
express warranties, guarantees, and correction remedies and the implied
warranty of workmanlike performance).
154. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing defective construction as negligence
and how negligence provides an alternative to a claim of implied warranty).
155. Hayden Bus. Ctr. Condo. Ass'n v. Pegasus Dev. Corp., 105 P.3d 157
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
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circumventing
contract remedies by recasting a contract claim as a
56
1
tort.
As already noted, courts have regularly implied significant
warranties of quality construction into residential building
contracts, and many courts have extended those implied
warranties to subsequent residential purchasers. 517 But because
the courts have not uniformly used implied warranty theory to
protect subsequent purchasers, creative lawyers representing
disappointed buyers of pre-owned residences frequently tender
negligence as the alternative theory. " The courts have reacted
inconsistently to this tactic.159 Because the cases on either side of
the issue reflect the policy views of different courts about whether
to extend or to curb consumer protection, these decisions have
limited interest for present purposes. It is sufficient here simply
to note that in reaching conflicting results, the courts have made
fundamental policy decisions characteristic of contemporary tort
theory in consumer situations.
For example, on one side of this policy divide, the South
Carolina Supreme Court enthusiastically imposed responsibility
for the negligent infliction of economic harm on a home builder
even though the builder never sold the house to any consumer at
all but instead transferred it to a creditor who in turn sold it to the
consumer.160 The result flowed inevitably from an established
judicial commitment to consumer protection. "We have made it
clear that it would be intolerable to allow builders to place
defective and inferior construction into the stream of commerce.
The practical difficulties facing today's new home buyer mandate
that we allow a buyer to ordinarily proceed against both the
builder and seller, or either of them."161
The Florida Supreme Court came down on the other side of
the debate in Casa Clara Condominium Association v. Charley
Toppin & Sons, Inc.,162 in which a homeowner brought a negligent
infliction of economic loss claim against a subcontractor with
whom the homeowner had no direct contract. The court rejected
the claim based on Florida's economic loss rule, which has had a
long and complex history in Florida's tort law.'63
156. Id. at 159.
157. See generally George Lefcoe, Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How
the Real Estate Industry Eased the Transition from Caveat Emptor to "Seller
Tell All," 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 193, 209-13 (2004); E.F. Roberts, The
Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CORNELL
L. Q. 835 (1967).
158. See Jones, supra note 150, at 1077-83.
159. Id.
160. Kennedy, 384 S.E.2d at 733, 736.

161. Id. at 736 (citations omitted).
162. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
163. See Usow, supra note 4.
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We are urged to make an exception to the economic loss doctrine for
homeowners. Buying a house is the largest investment many
consumers ever make.., and homeowners are an appealing,
sympathetic class. If a house causes economic disappointment by not
meeting a purchaser's expectations, the resulting failure to receive
the benefit of the bargain is a core concern of contract, not tort, law.
There are protections for homebuyers, however, such as statutory
warranties, the general warranty of habitability, and the duty of
sellers to disclose defects, as well as the ability of purchasers to
inspect houses for defects. Coupled with homebuyers' power to
bargain over price, these protections must be viewed as sufficient
when compared with the mischief that could be caused by allowing
tort recovery for purely economic losses. Therefore, we again "hold
contract principles more appropriate than tort principles for
recovering economic loss without an accompanying physical injury
or property damage." If we held otherwise, "contract law would
drown in a sea of tort." We refuse to hold that homeowners are not
subject to the economic loss rule.'6
Subsequent
developments
in
Florida's
economic
torts
jurisprudence cast some doubt on the continuing vitality of the
Casa Clara opinion. 16 But apparently the case remains
good law
66
at least for the specific situation involved in that case. 1
While these conflicting residential defect cases present an
interesting and important consumer protection policy debate, they
say little about the policies that should determine whether or to
what extent the law should distinguish between physical and
economic harm. Of far greater interest on that issue are a few
cases that hold or imply that different results should apply to
defect claims brought by subsequent purchasers depending on
whether the theory advanced is implied warranty or negligence.
Two cases in this category that reach opposite conclusions notably
highlight the status of purely economic loss claims in construction
cases.
In ruling on a subsequent purchaser's construction defect
claim, the North Carolina Supreme Court first held that
regardless of the validity of any claim based on breach of an

164. Id. at 1247 (citations and footnotes omitted).
165. See Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 975-76 (Fla. 1999) (holding that
professional negligence claims can be brought against individual professionals
even if there is no privity of contract between the homeowner and the
professional).
166. In Indem. Ins. Co. v. Am. Aviation, Inc., 891 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 2004)
the court held that "the 'economic loss doctrine' or 'economic loss rule' bars a
negligence action to recover solely economic damages only in circumstances
where the parties are either in contractual privity or the defendant is a
manufacturer or distributor of a product, and no established exception to the
application of the rule applies." By quoting from Casa Clara with apparent
approval, the court seems to have left the case intact at least in the context of
a claim against a subcontractor who supplies materials. See id. at 536 n.1.
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implied warranty, plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently states a claim
The court then held that a subsequent
for negligence. " "'
purchaser
should be able to recover purely economic
residential
The court was especially
losses for negligent construction.
this
policy-laden
argument:
persuaded by
The ordinary purchaser of a home is not qualified to determine
when or where a defect exists. Yet, the purchaser makes the biggest
and most important investment in his or her life and, more times
than not, on a limited budget. The purchaser can ill afford to
suddenly find a latent defect in his or her home that completely
destroys the family's budget and have no remedy for recourse. This
happens too often. The careless work of contractors, who in the past
have been insulated from liability, must cease or they must accept
financial responsibility for their negligence. In our judgment,
building contractors should be held to the general standard of
reasonable care for the protection of anyone who may foreseeably be
endangered by their negligence.'6
In an area of the law so beset by conflicting and shifting opinions,
it is fitting irony that the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted
this language from a Florida Court of Appeals case that was
effectively overruled a few years later when the Florida Supreme
Court decided Casa Clara, a case that itself now seems
endangered or at least severely limited.

69

The New Hampshire Supreme Court also authorized a
subsequent residential purchaser to recover purely economic
losses. 7' The interesting twist, however, is the court's holding
that purely economic losses may be recovered only under an
implied warranty claim and not a negligent construction claim.
We have previously denied aggrieved subsequent purchasers
recovery in tort for economic loss and denied them recovery under
an implied warranty theory for economic loss. See Ellis v. Morris
supra. The court in Ellis acknowledged the problems a subsequent
purchaser faces, but declined to follow the examples of those cases
which allow recovery. The policy arguments relied upon in Ellis for
precluding tort recovery for economic loss, in these circumstances,
accurately reflect New Hampshire law and present judicial
scholarship, and, as such, remain controlling on the negligence
claim. 171

167. Oates v. JG, Inc., 333 S.E.2d 222, 225 (N.C. 1985).
168. Id. at 225-26 (quoting from Simmons v. Owens, 363 So.2d 142 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), disapproved by Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1248 n.9).
169. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.

170. Lempke, 547 A.2d 290. While the case involved construction of a
garage, because the opinion is peppered with references to residential
construction and home builders, one can infer that the property was
residential. Id. at 291.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
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Having thus summarily resolved to stand by the precedent against
the negligence claim, the court next turned to the implied
warranty claim. As a first step in the analysis, the court held that
privity should no longer be required on a claim for breach of a
builder's implied warranty of good workmanship. 172 This led the
court to consider "whether we should allow recovery for purely
economic harm, which generally is that loss resulting from the
failure of the product to perform to the level expected by the buyer
and is commonly measured by the cost of repairing or replacing
the product."'73
Much theoretical debate has taken place on whether to allow
economic recovery and whether tort or contract is the most
appropriate vehicle for such recovery.
It is clear that the majority of courts do not allow economic loss
recovery in tort, but that economic loss is recoverable in contract,
and that economic loss recovery "is consistent with the policy of
warranty law to protect expectations of suitability and quality...."
However, what is less clear is whether courts allow recovery for
economic loss on an implied warranty theory, without privity, in
situations such as ours.
We agree with the courts that allow economic recovery in implied
warranty for subsequent purchasers, finding as they have that the
contention that a distinction should be drawn between mere
"economic loss" and personal injury is without merit. Why there
should be a difference between an economic loss resulting from
injury to property and an economic loss resulting from personal
injury has not been revealed to us. When one is personally injured
from a defect, he recovers mainly for his economic loss. Similarly, if
a wife loses a husband because of injury resulting from a defect in
construction, the measure of damages is totally economic loss. We
fail to see any rational reason for such a distinction.
If there is a defect in a stairway and the purchaser repairs the
defect and suffers an economic loss, should he fail to recover because
he did not wait until he or some member of his family fell down the
stairs and broke his neck? Does the law penalize those who are alert
and prevent injury? Should it not put those who prevent personal
injury on the same level as those who fail to anticipate it? The
vendee has a right to expect to receive that for which he has
bargained.174
The opinion provided no convincing reason why a consumer
protection policy this strong takes effect under an implied
172. Id. at 294.
173. Id. at 296.

174. Id. at 296-97 (quoting extensively from Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342
N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1976)).
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warranty theory but not under an ordinary negligence theory. Nor
did it explain why a residential purchaser "has a right to expect to
recover" from a builder with whom the purchaser never dealt "that
for which he has bargained" with someone else. The dissenting
opinion by Justice Souter suggested that the majority's distinction
between negligent construction and implied warranty merely
masked the absence of any "justification to repudiate the rationale
unanimously adopted by this court a mere two years ago."' 5
The cases ruling on property owners' claims for economic loss
resulting from defective construction, especially those involving
residential construction, show no consistent momentum in one
direction or the other. Perhaps public policy considerations that
differ from one jurisdiction to another will continue to produce
inconsistent results for the foreseeable future.'76 Eventually, state
legislatures may take up the problem of defective residential
construction, as some already have.'77
5. Beyond ConstructionDefects
Economic loss claims by owners of defective projects present
the most common construction industry situations in which
negligence may serve as the basis for recovering purely economic
loss in tort. But they are not the only ones. Errant construction
activity frequently causes adverse economic consequences for those
who do not own the project under construction, sometimes even for
those who have no involvement in the project at all. As previously
discussed, some early construction industry cases, reflecting the
status of tort theory at the time, used proximate cause and
foreseeability to dispose of claims brought by remote plaintiffs,
and they did so with little, if any, consideration of the distinction
between physical and economic harm.' 8 As more expansive
175. Id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. Chief Justice Rose, of the Nevada Supreme Court, provided one
example of how local considerations may influence the debate in this passage
from a dissenting opinion in Calloway H:
The economic loss doctrine is a judicial creation - it is not a statute that
we are compelled to follow. It is a principle of law we can adopt or reject

depending on what better serves Nevadans. With so much hasty
construction taking place in Nevada today, I think the better path would
be to arm our home purchasers with all available remedies, when faced
with a defectively constructed home, rather than the one taken by the
majority today.

993 P.2d at 1278.
177. See generally

BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 153, at § 9:49
(discussing state governments that have provided special legislation for
residential construction professionals).
178. See, e.g., Ford, 14 F.2d at 255 (holding that a contractor could not be
liable to a third person injured by the collapse of the contractor's structure);
Byrd, 43 S.E. at 421 (affirming summary judgment against business owner
because contractor had no legal duty to the business owner).
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theories of tort liability took hold in the courts, the negligence
cases shifted distinctly away from any single factor toward a more
openly policy-laden process of balancing multiple factors to
determine whether or not to impose a duty of care on the
defendant.179 Outside of the residential defect cases, however, if
the remote plaintiffs theory is ordinary negligence, the results
remain predominated against liability. 8 ' Negligent construction
has not, at least for now, achieved wide recognition as a valid
claim in the absence of physical harm.
The California Supreme Court has been more receptive than
other courts to claims of economic loss based on negligent
construction. The watershed event was the court's decision in
J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 8' a case involving a contractor's delay in
completing improvements at the Sonoma County Airport. The
year was 1979, an era before the economic loss rule took hold in
construction industry cases in other jurisdictions. In JAire, the
court recognized "a cause of action for negligent loss of expected
economic advantage."'82 The plaintiff was the tenant operating a
restaurant in leased premises being improved under a contract
between the County of Sonoma and the defendant contractor.1 83
The opinion did not mention any terms of the lease between the
plaintiff and the county, except that the lease obligated the county
to provide heat and air conditioning.'
Although the construction contract did not specify a target
completion date, the tenant "alleged the work was to have been
completed within a reasonable time as defined by custom and
usage." 8 ' The plaintiff also alleged that specific requests had been
made of the defendant for timely completion.'
The construction
delay prevented the tenant from operating its restaurant business,
resulting in the loss of business and profits.'87 Although the

179. See supra Part II.B (discussing the concept of tort liability for economic

loss).
180. See, e.g., Hayden Bus. Ctr., 105 P.3d at 160-61 (holding breach of

implied warranty of good workmanship is a contract claim that can only be
brought by a party to the contract); Azco Constr., 10 P.3d at 1264-66 (applying
the economic loss rule to deny plaintiffs claim for tort liability where
defendant's failure to perform sounded in contract); Smith, 680 P.2d at 1154
(holding that absent privity of contract, the economic loss rule barred
recovery); Local Joint Executive Bd. of Las Vegas, Culinary Workers Union,
Local No. 226 v. Stern, 651 P.2d 637, 638 (Nev. 1982) (declining to overrule
the economic loss rule and adopt the minority view allowing recovery for
negligent interference with economic expectations).
181. 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
182. Id. at 63.
183. Id. at 61.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 61, 63.
187. Id. at 62.
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plaintiff originally asserted claims both under a third party
beneficiary theory and negligence, when the trial court sustained
the defendant's demurrer, the plaintiff only appealed as to the
negligence cause of action."
The court's discussion opened, as one would expect, with a
duty analysis:
Liability for negligent conduct may only be imposed where there is a
duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff or to a class of
which the plaintiff is a member. A duty of care may arise through
statute or by contract. Alternatively, a duty may be premised upon
the general character of the activity in which the defendant
engaged, the relationship between the parties or even the
interdependent nature of human society. Whether a duty is owed is
simply a shorthand way of phrasing what is "the essential question
whether the plaintiffs interests are entitled to legal protection
against the defendant's conduct."
Even when only injury to prospective economic advantage is
claimed, recovery is not foreclosed. Where a special relationship
exists between the parties, a plaintiff may recover for loss of
expected economic advantage through the negligent performance of
a contract although the parties were not in contractual privity. "'
The court next applied the Biakanja factors to the facts pled
and concluded that the contractor "had a duty to complete
construction in a manner that would have avoided unnecessary
injury to appellant's business, even though the construction
contract was with the owner of a building rather than with
appellant, the tenant."19 One of the factors that weighed into the
court's analysis was that the defendant's conduct "was particularly
blameworthy since it continued after the probability of damage
was drawn directly to respondent's attention."'91 In responding to
the defendant's economic loss argument, the court placed special
emphasis on the fact that the harm to the plaintiffs business was
foreseeable. 192
The J'Aire decision may represent an especially significant
exception among the negligent construction cases.
This is
certainly true if one reads the opinion to impose on a contractor a
duty of care in favor of all whose economic interests may be
foreseeably harmed by the contractor's negligence. The opinion
did not, however, necessarily establish a liability standard that
broad. Perhaps the court viewed the case as presenting unusual

188. Id.

189. Id. at 62-63 (internal citations omitted).
190. Id. at 64.
191. Id. at 63.
192. Id. at 64-66.
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circumstances entitled to special weight under the moral blame
and public policy factors of the Biakanja formula because the
complaint could be read to assert "wilful failure or refusal of a
contractor to prosecute a construction project with diligence."'93
Whatever significance the case may have in an abstract sense, it
has not influenced negligent construction cases in other
jurisdictions to the same extent as California cases have in other
areas of tort law, and it may well evidence a unique California
jurisprudence on economic loss.'94
Taken together, the negligence cases show only that ordinary
negligence in construction activities cannot be completely
dismissed as a basis to recover purely economic loss, especially if
the plaintiff is a residential owner in a jurisdiction with a strong
consumer protection perspective. By contrast, courts have been
more receptive to professional negligence and negligent
misrepresentation claims. But as the following Subparts C and D
show, the construction cases involving these alternative tort
theories do not present a coherent body of law.

193. Id. at 63. The meaning of the court's full statement on this point is
ambiguous. The language quoted in the text made reference to a regulatory
penalty for a licensed contractor who willfully delays a project. It is not clear
that the court read the complaint to plead willful delay. The quoted passage
probably suggests only that the court believed that the disciplinary penalty for
willful delay showed that California public policy supported holding a
contractor liable for the consequences of avoidable delays. The court reasoned
that, even though the legislative penalty for willful delay "does not provide a
basis for imposing liability where the delay in completing construction is due
merely to negligence, it does indicate the seriousness with which the
Legislature views unnecessary delays in the completion of construction." Id.
at 64.
194. Even within California, the significance and influence of J'Aire remains
uncertain. See BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 153, § 17:97 (finding that the
California courts have viewed the J'Aire decision differently and characterized
it as a limited exception to the general rule). Moreover, one could argue that
the California Supreme Court has been unusually open to economic loss claims
even in products liability cases. See Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp.,
102 P.3d 268 (2004) (noting that the economic loss rule did not bar a buyer's
fraud and intentional misrepresentation claims against the seller of a
defective product even though the same conduct was the basis for a breach of
contract claim); see also Christopher W. Arledge, Is the California Supreme
Court Confusing the Boundariesof the Economic Loss Rule?, ORANGE COUNTY
LAW., May 2005, at 22 (criticizing the Robinson Helicopter opinion's failure to
clarify where the economic loss rule ends and where tort law begins).
Robinson Helicopter may not in fact represent a California deviation with
respect to claims based on misrepresentation. See infra Part III.D (discussing
how courts have treated negligent misrepresentation claims more favorably
than other tort claims for purely economic loss in construction cases).
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C. ProfessionalNegligence

The specialized rules of professional negligence apply to
architects, engineers, and other design professionals.1 95 Clients
may assert malpractice claims either in contract or in tort, and
they often proceed under both theories.'
Professional negligence
represents
a long-standing
basis upon which a design
professional's client may recover purely economic loss in tort.' 97
Even so, courts sometimes proclaim an economic loss bar so
sweeping that it seems to cast doubt on the right of the design
professional's own client to proceed on a tort theory absent some
physical harm. 198
It is not surprising, therefore, that significant theoretical
questions arise when a non-client brings a professional negligence
claim to recover economic loss from a design professional. In one
common situation, a builder or subcontractor sues the owner's
architect or engineer to recover additional costs or delay damages
caused by errors in the design or by improper professional services
rendered during construction.199
In these situations, design
professionals routinely raise lack of privity as a defense and also
argue that purely economic damages should not be available.
Over the past three decades, an impressive assortment of courts

195. See Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 975-76 (discussing professional negligence
of engineers employed by home inspection company); see also Davidson &
Jones, Inc. v. County of New Hanover, 255 S.E.2d 580 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
(addressing professional negligence of surveyor or civil engineer as well as
architect); Eveleth, 225 N.W.2d at 524-25 (noting rules of professional
negligence concerning engineers).
196. See generally Kenneth I. Levin, Duties and Liabilities of the ArchitectEngineer to the Owner, in 1 CONSTRUCTION LAW HANDBOOK, § 4.03 (Robert F.
Cushman & James J. Myers eds., 1999) (noting that in many jurisdictions, an
owner can sue a design professional for malpractice under a tort theory of
negligence and breach of contract).
197. See, e.g., Eggers Partnership, 82-1 B.C.A. (CCH) 15,630 (IBCA 1982)
(permitting recovery of economic loss resulting from an architect's negligent
design of a roof); Eveleth, 225 N.W.2d at 528-31 (discussing an engineer's
negligence in the design of a new water treatment plant and whether recovery
of economic loss in tort is appropriate); Scott v. Potomac Ins. Co., 341 P.2d
1083, 1087 (Ore. 1959) (concluding that the hospital had a valid malpractice
claim against the architect for economic loss).
198. See supra Part III.A (discussing the difficulty in extracting a consistent
approach to the economic loss issue in construction cases).
199. See, e.g., A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973)
(detailing a claim where a general contractor sued a supervising contractor for
damages caused by the negligence of the architect); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum, Inc., 392 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1968) (discussing
a suit brought by contractor's surety against an architectural firm for
negligent supervision of the construction project); Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.
Supp. at 132 (describing a general contractor's counterclaim against an
architect for negligent misrepresentation and subsequent damages).
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has rejected these defenses." ° Other courts, however, continue to
struggle with whether and when either or both of these defenses
should bar the claim.2 °'
200. See, e.g., Ellis-Don Constr., Inc. v. HKS, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 603, 607
(M.D. N.C. 2004) (noting that North Carolina's economic loss rule did not limit
tort actions that arose in the absence of a contract); Hydro Investors, Inc. v.
Trafalgar Power, Inc., 227 F.3d 8, 17 (2d Cir. 2000) (concluding that the
privity rule is not always applied in negligence cases); Rousseau, 727 A.2d at
190 (holding that privity of contract was not needed in the tort action between
a contractor and an engineer); Griffin Plumbing & Heating, 463 S.E.2d at 85
(rejecting the lack of privity defense in a negligence action between a
contractor and design engineer); Mid-Western Elec., Inc. v. DeWild Grant
Reckert & Assocs. Co., 500 N.W.2d 250, 254 (S.D. 1993) (noting that in South
Dakota, a cause of action exists for economic damage in the professional
negligence context, even in the absence of contractual privity); Guardian
Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378, 1387 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1990) (rejecting a design engineer's argument that construction companies
could not recover for purely economic losses due to lack of privity of contract);
Forte Bros., Inc. v. Nat'l Amusements, Inc., 525 A.2d 1301, 1303 (R.I. 1987)
(noting that, despite the absence of privity, a general contractor who suffered
economic loss proximately caused by the inadequate performance of a site
engineer had a cause of action sounding in negligence); Waldor Pump &
Equip. Co. v. Orr-Schelen-Mayeron & Assoc., Inc. 386 N.W.2d 375, 376-77
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (rejecting an engineer's lack of privity defense against a
subcontractor's negligence claim and finding that harm to subcontractors as a
result of the engineer's negligent drafting or interpretation of deisgn
specifications was foreseeable); Donnelly Constr. Co v. Obert/Hunt/Gilleland,
677 P.2d 1292, 1295-96 (Ariz. 1984) (noting that a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation does not require privity); Mayor & City Council, 550 F.
Supp. at 610 (concluding that the design professional breached its contractual
duty and was negligent in its design, and therefore was liable to the contractor
for additional construction expenses); Conforti & Eisele, 418 A.2d at 1290
(rejecting a design professional's defense that no contractual privity existed);
Davidson & Jones, 255 S.E.2d at 580 (holding that a general contractor or a
subcontractor could sue an architect, even in the absence of privity, for
economic loss foreseeably resulting from the architect's negligence); A.R.
Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 397 (noting that a contractor who may be foreseeably
injured or who may sustain an economic loss proximately caused by the
negligent performance of a contractual duty of an architect may bring a cause
of action against the architect, notwithstanding the absence of privity).
201. See, e.g., Hanover Ins. Co. v. Corrpro Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 816 (E.D. Va.
2004) (involving a suit between an inspector and a contractor's surety in the
absence of contractual privity); Berschauer, 881 P.2d 986 (holding that the
economic loss rule did not allow a general contractor to recover purely
economic damages from a design professional in tort); Floor Craft, 560 N.E.2d
at 206 (refusing to assign liability to an architect in the absence of privity of
contract); Malta Constr., 694 F. Supp. at 902 (holding that the general
contractor's tort allegations fell within the negligent misrepresentation
exception to the economic loss rule and therefore were not barred); Fireman's
Fund Ins., 679 N.E.2d at 1197 (holding that the economic loss doctrine barred
recovery in a tort action against an engineer for purely economic loss);
Thomson, 899 S.W.2d at 415 (holding that the economic loss rule bars recovery
under a negligence claim); 2314 Lincoln Park W. Condo. Ass'n v. Mann, Gin,
Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ill. 1990) (noting that purely
economic losses are not recoverable in a tort action based simply on the
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The privity defense retains some limited life. For example,
New York still requires "actual privity of contract between the
" 2
parties or a relationship so close as to approach that of privity. 02
But historic forces work convincingly against its continued vitality
in most jurisdictions. A defense based on privity of contract
typically asserts that because the design professional's duty of care
under tort law stems from a contractual relationship, the
professional duty of care runs only in favor of a party to that
contract. 03 When applied to a plaintiff who suffers foreseeable
harm, that argument retains little force under prevailing tort
theory. 2
The non-client's theory is derived from the same
rationale that imposes a tort duty of professional care in favor of
the design professional's client. "The contract merely furnishes
the occasion, or creates the relationship which furnishes the
occasion, for the tort."00
Once the plaintiff establishes the
relationship giving rise to an independent duty of care under tort
law, lack of privity is no defense in most jurisdictions. The reason
reflects the historic battle long since won against the traditional
privity defense.
We cannot ignore the half century of development in negligence law
originating in MacPherson and are impelled to conclude that the
position and authority of a supervising architect are such that he
ought to labor under a duty to the prime contractor to supervise the

defeated expectations of one party); Widett v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 815

F.2d 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that under New York law, an
architectural firm was not liable either in tort or contract to a subcontractor
absent privity between them); Blake Constr. Co. v. Alley, 353 S.E.2d 724, 727
(Va. 1987) (holding that, absent privity, a contractor was not entitled to
recover from an architectal firm for purely economic losses).
202. Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 539
N.E.2d 91, 94 (N.Y. 1989). "It is well settled in New York, however, that
professionals are not liable either in tort or contract absent privity." Widett,
815 F.2d at 886, citing Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441 (1931).
203. See, e.g., Presnell Constr. Managers, 134 S.W.3d at 579; Mid-Western
Elec., 500 N.W.2d at 253; Shoffner Indus., Inc. v. W.B. Lloyd Constr. Co., 257
S.E.2d 50, 54-55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
204. See, e.g., Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 977-79 (providing reasons why a lack
of privity between a plaintiff and defendant does not bar a negligence claim);
Mid-Western Elec., 500 N.W.2d at 253-54 (stating that a privity requirement
in negligence claims would condone professionals negligently performing their
work); Shoffner Indus., 257 S.E.2d at 54-55 (explaining why lack of privity
does not bar a negligence claim). "[Tihe expansion of liability to third parties
now establishes the proposition that a contractor hired by the client to
construct a building, although not in privity with the architect, may recover
from the architect any extra costs resulting from the architect's negligence. To
hold otherwise would require that we ignore the modern concepts of tort
liability." Id. at 55.
205. Id. at 54-55 (quoting from Toone v. Adams, 262 N.C. 403, 407, 137
S.E.2d 132, 135 (1964)).
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project with due care under the circumstances, even though his sole
206
contractual relationship is with the owner.
Knowing that privity has lost its luster, counsel for design
professionals increasingly argue instead that the same policybased economic loss rule commonly applied in products liability
cases should also bar a non-client's professional malpractice claim.
In contrast to the privity defense, the economic loss argument
presents a more formidable hurdle for contemporary courts.
Design professionals advance the familiar case for an economic
loss bar. Plaintiffs react with equally familiar responses. In the
end, an increasing number of cases reject a per se bar against
purely economic loss for design malpractice. 27 Because the debate
over the economic loss rule dominates the recent cases, a few
selected opinions illustrating the competing arguments merit
careful review.
Initially, recall that some jurisdictions do not adhere to a
broad rule barring recovery for purely economic losses even under
products liability law." 8
In those jurisdictions, a court may
quickly dispose of any argument for a special rule barring recovery
of purely economic loss in a design malpractice case.2 9 In other
jurisdictions, courts have rejected the economic loss defense on the
basis that the bias against purely economic damages is unique to
products liability jurisprudence.l°
Some of the cases that reach the opposite result and bar
recovery seem to do so based on a mechanical transfer of the
products liability rule and rationale to professional malpractice
cases.21 1 In other jurisdictions, however, the economic loss rule has
206. Id. at 55. Although the quoted language retains force as a general
rationale for imposing on a project architect a relatively broad duty of care,
contemporary design contracts often expressly relieve the architect of any duty
to supervise construction means and methods. See infra note 220 and
accompanying text (stating that the project architect's broad duty is logical
when the architect's power is comparable to "economic life or death," but that
most design contracts limit an architect's power in order to limit possible
liability).
207. See supra note 201 (providing cases in which the court does not bar
design malpractice claims because the loss was purely economic).
208. See supra Part II.C (articulating and discussing the different positions
adopted by various jurisdictions related to economic losses in products liability
cases).
209. See Best Friends Pet Care, Inc. v. Design Learned, Inc., No.
X06CV0001697555, 2003 WL 22962147 (Conn. Super. Ct., Dec. 3, 2003); see
also Conforti & Eisele, 418 A.2d at 1292.
210. Mid-Western Elec., 500 N.W.2d at 253-54; Waldor Pump & Equip., 386
N.W.2d at 377.
211. See, e.g., Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1259-60 (noting that the economic loss
doctrine stands for the proposition that, outside of products liability law, a
party cannot recover in tort when the law of contract should apply); Blake
Constr., 353 S.E.2d at 727 (explaining that, in construction contexts, parties
protect against purely economic losses by way of contract negotiation).
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taken hold as a tort law policy that transcends products liability
law.2 12 In those jurisdictions, a design malpractice plaintiff who
seeks purely economic damages and who faces a motion to dismiss
or a motion for summary judgment must marshal arguments for
an exception to the rule. In these situations, many opinions
evaluate predictable, substantive themes that reflect the tension
between the alluring power of expanded tort theory and the
judicial instinct for reasonable liability limits. In effect, and not
uncommonly through express citation, these courts follow a
process consistent with the Biakanja formula."'
Some of the most thoughtful opinions rejecting a per se rule
have held that the decisive factors are whether the plaintiffs
economic loss is foreseeable and whether it is closely connected to
the defendant's malpractice.1
Others emphasized that
circumstances may establish a special relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff that is similar to that between a
professional and a client. On that basis, these opinions imposed a
duty of professional care that is independent from the defendant's
purely contractual obligations. 1 '
Other equally thoughtful
opinions, by contrast, apply the economic loss rule on the broad
theoretical basis that in building construction matters, no less
than in product sales, contract principles are more applicable than
212. See Silverstein, supra note 69, at 409-22 (describing the history and
development of the economic loss rule in tort litigation).
213. See, e.g., Conforti & Eisele, 418 A.2d at 1292 (identifying the factors
raised in Biakanja for determining liability for negligence, and concluding that
based upon such factors, a design professional could be required to answer in
tort to a contractor who suffers purely economic losses as a result of the design
professional's negligence); Westerhold, 419 S.W.2d at 81 (stating that while
each and every factor itemized in Biakanja need not be present to sustain a
cause of action for negligence, they must be weighed along with the traditional
policy reasons for limiting lawsuits for negligent performance of a duty under
a contract to those in privity of contract).
214. See, e.g., Mid-Western Elec., 500 N.W.2d at 254 (instructing trial courts
to look to the foreseeability of injury if contract breach were to occur in order
to determine the duty of a deisgn professional defendant); Donnelly Constr.,
677 P.2d at 1295-96 (ruling that, "design professionals are liable for
foreseeable injuries to foreseeable victims which proximately result from their
negligent performance of their professional services."); Davidson & Jones, 255
S.E.2d at 584 (holding that in absence of privity, a general contractor or a
subcontractor would still be able to sue an architect for a foreseeable economic
loss originating from the design professionals' duty of care).
215. See, e.g., Griffin Plumbing & Heating, 463 S.E.2d at 87-88 (describing
that a multitude of states have recognized an exception to the economic loss
rule when a special relationship between the design professional and the
contractor is present); Mayor & City Council, 550 F. Supp. at 623-24 (stating
that Mississippi law imposed on design professionals a duty, much like that
imposed on other professionals, to "exercise ordinary professional skill and
diligence"); Davidson & Jones, 255 S.E.2d at 584 (clarifying that an architect
has a duty to exercise abilities typically demonstrated by similarly situated
architects when completing a project).
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tort principles when economic harm is not accompanied by
physical harm.216
In this array, a few opinions especially stand out because they
attempted to give due weight to factors endemic to professional
services rendered in the building construction setting. That is to
say, some opinions reflect a contextual approach similar to the one
this Article advocates.
Some courts, for example, have been
dissuaded from applying a broad economic loss bar because to do
so would effectively eliminate professional malpractice remedies
against certain professionals whose errors often threaten
significant pecuniary damage but rarely bring physical harm.217
This argument holds special force with respect to malpractice by
accountants and lawyers, but it also sometimes applies to design
malpractice.
The courts are struck by the incongruity of
recognizing a consistent professional standard of care for all
professional services while effectively removing some professions
from the prospect of liability for malpractice.
Several other courts view the relationship between a project
architect and a builder as one in which the architect has so much
power over the contractor that the law must impose a duty on the
architect to avoid causing economic harm to the contractor.1 8
Although this argument has force when the architect's authority is
so extensive that it is "tantamount to a power of economic life or
death,"2 9 contemporary
construction and design services
agreements commonly avoid that degree of control for the very
purpose of reducing the architect's risk of tort liability. 220 For this
216. Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 980.
217. See, e.g., Hydro Investors, 227 F.3d at 18 (stating that despite some
professional malpractice cases' holdings that the economic loss bars recovery
when pure economic loss is at issue, the better choice is to permit recovery for
economic loss in a narrow exception of cases dealing with liability stemming
from a breach of a professional duty because if such an exception did not exist,
recovery would be barred in many malpractice actions); Moransais, 744 So. 2d
at 983 (recognizing that applying the economic loss rule to actions against
design professional would eliminate those causes of action because they
generally allege purely economic losses).
218. See, e.g., Ellis-Don Constr., 353 F. Supp. 2d at 605 (explaining that
under North Carolina case law, a lawsuit by a contractor against an architect
may be maintained even in the absence of privity because of the degree of
power design professionals hold over contractors); Forte Bros., 525 A.2d at
1303 (reversing summary judgment for defendant architect on plaintiff
contractor's appeal, because the court found that the architect owed the
contractor a duty to perform professionally); A.R. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 401
(referring to law review comments and prior case law proposing that a design
professional's liability should be in accordance with the amount of power the
design professional holds over the contractor); Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp.
at 135-36 (acknowledging the power imbalance between an architect and
contractor).
219. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 136.
220. See SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 269-71 (reiterating that
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reason, one might doubt the validity of this rationale as applied to
many contemporary construction projects.
In 1994 the Supreme Court of Washington decided
22
Berschauer/Phillips Construction Co. v. Seattle School District,
'
in which a contractor sued the owner's architect and its structural
engineering consultant on the basis that their negligence in design
and inspection caused project delays.1 2 The court's opinion is
unusually perceptive in recognizing unique construction industry
factors that counsel caution when one participant in a project
asserts that it has incurred additional costs because of the conduct
of another participant with whom the claimant has no contractual
relationship.
Before the court turned its attention to the
construction industry context, however, it paid homage to one of
the most familiar justifications for barring recovery of purely
economic loss in tort cases.
The economic loss rule marks the fundamental boundary between
the law of contracts, which is designed to enforce expectations
created by agreement, and the law of torts, which is designed to
protect citizens and their property by imposing a duty of reasonable
care on others. The economic loss rule was developed to prevent
disproportionate liability and allow parties to allocate risk by
contract. 223
Courts frequently sound this theme not only in construction
industry cases224 but also in many other claims involving purely
economic loss.225

contracts often limit the design professional's risk of tort liability by carefully
limiting the design professional's power and control over the contractor and
the construction process).
221. 881 P.2d 986 (Wash. 1994).
222. Berschauer,881 P.2d at 988. Although the court's brief summary of the
contractor's claims may be read to suggest that the contractor advanced an
ordinary negligence theory, the case is appropriately considered within the
professional negligence context because the contractor solely alleged negligent
performance of professional duties by the owner's architect, the structural
engineering consultant, and a construction inspection firm. Id. at 988-99. The
court's resolution of the case made it unnecessary to analyze the plaintiffs
principal legal theory.
223. Id. at 989-90 (citations omitted).
224. See, e.g., Prendiville, 83 P.3d at 1263 (holding that the economic loss
doctrine applied in a residential construction defect case where rights and
liabilities of the parties were governed by contract and express warranties);
City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 838 (Haw. 1998) (holding
that a tort action for negligent misrepresentation seeking recovery for
economic losses was not available to a party in privity of contract with a
design professional).
225. See Laubmeier, supra note 4, at 231-34 (distinguishing between tort
and contractual remedies and discussing the need to preserve that distinction
when considering the application of the economic loss doctrine).
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Having set the stage, the court explained the special reasons
for preferring contract over tort to resolve purely economic loss
claims arising in the construction industry.
We... maintain the fundamental boundaries of tort and contract
law by limiting the recovery of economic loss due to construction
delays to the remedies provided by contract. We so hold to ensure
that the allocation of risk and the determination of potential future
liability is based on what the parties bargained for in the contract.
We hold parties to their contracts. If tort and contract remedies
were allowed to overlap, certainty and predictability in allocating
risk would decrease and impede future business activity. The
construction industry in particular would suffer, for it is in this
industry that we see most clearly the importance of the precise
allocation of risk as secured by contract. The fees charged by
architects, engineers, contractors, developers, vendors, and so on are
founded on their expected liability exposure as bargained and
provided for in the contract ....
A bright line distinction between the remedies offered in contract
and tort with respect to economic damages also encourages parties
to negotiate toward the risk distribution that is desired or
customary. We preserve the incentive to adequately self-protect
during the bargaining process. If we held to the contrary, a party
could bring a cause of action in tort to recover benefits they were
unable to obtain in contractual negotiations. 226
In BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 7 the Colorado Supreme
A detailed
Court refined Berschauer's contextual analysis.
summary of the facts pled by the plaintiff is essential to
understand how the commercial circumstances influenced the
decision.2 8 The City and County of Denver entered into a contract
with BRW under which BRW agreed to design two bridge projects
and to provide additional professional services during
226. Berschauer, 881 P.2d at 992-93 (citations omitted). Professor Gergen
cites Berschauer as an example of one way in which courts sometimes apply a
general principle precluding tort liability for economic loss when "the claimant
could have obtained redress for the harm from the actor by contract with the
actor or through a chain of contracts reaching back to the actor. . .

."

Gergen,

supra note 2, at 764. The Washington Supreme Court was also influenced by
the Washington legislature's decision to deny recovery in products liability
claims for purely economic loss. Berschauer, 881 P.2d at 993. The
nonsequitur in that part of the court's analysis seems obvious. The legislative
decision in the products liability area most likely reflects the same policies
unique to products liability theory that have led the majority of courts to apply
the economic loss rule in that area of the law without regard to the fact that
other tort theories permit recovery of purely economic losses. See supra Part
II.C (showing how construction negligence cases reference products liability
precedent when considering economic loss).
227. 99 P.3d 66 (Colo. 2004).
228. The summary in the text adopts the abbreviations the opinion uses to
refer to the parties.
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construction, and BRW in turn hired a consulting firm, PSI, to
inspect the construction."' The City eventually entered into a
contract with a general contractor, Kraemer, to build the bridges
in accordance with BRW's design, and Kraemer subcontracted a
portion of the work to a company that further subcontracted with
Dufficy to fabricate and paint parts of the steel structures. 30
Dufficy encountered substantial problems and additional costs
that it claimed resulted from defects in BRW's plans and from
negligent inspections by PSI.2"' Dufficy's subcontract required
that it prosecute any claims relating to the contract under the
City's administrative claims procedure, and Dufficy did this and
ultimately settled with the City and Kraemer.'32
While the administrative claim was pending, Dufficy filed the
suit against BRW and PSI.233 Dufficy claimed that BRW's painting
specifications, which Dufficy was required to follow, were
inappropriate for Denver's altitude and arid climate and that PSI
was negligent in carrying out its role in inspecting and giving
instructions relating to the paint system.234
The trial court
dismissed Dufficy's claims based on Colorado's economic loss rule,
but the court of appeals reversed on the basis that the rule did not
bar recovery of purely economic losses that allegedly flowed from a
defendant's breach of an independent tort duty owed to a plaintiff
with whom the defendant had no contract.23' This rationale by
which a court imposes a duty of care on a professional as a matter
of tort policy reflects the dominant underlying theory of
professional negligence cases.23 Starting from this basis, because
Dufficy had no contractual relationship with either BRW or PSI,
and because the court of appeals held that design professionals
owe to contractors and subcontractors an independent tort duty of
care in performing professional services in circumstances such as
those that Dufficy pled, the court of appeals held that the trial
court's dismissal of the claims was error. 237
The Colorado Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition
for certiorari. In its opinion reversing the court of appeals and
upholding the trial court's dismissal of Dufficy's claims, the court
stressed the conflict between Dufficy's theory of liability and the
229. Id. at 67-68.
230. Id. at 68.
231. Id. at 69-70.
232. Id. at 69-71. Those parties reached their settlement after the court of
appeals ruled, but it is not clear what effect the decision of the court of appeals
may have had on the settlement negotiations. Id. at 71.
233. Id. at 70.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 70-71.
236. See Specialty Designs, supra note 1, at 177-79 (arguing that negligence
dominates over contract law in design defect cases).
237. Dufficy, 99 P.3d at 71.
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consensual risk allocation scheme contemplated by the web of
interrelated contracts among the multiple participants involved
the bridge projects. By asking the court to impose on BRW and
PSI a duty to perform their professional services with due care to
avoid causing Dufficy economic harm, Dufficy was, in effect,
petitioning for retrospective reallocation of risk - a judicially
imposed substitute for the consensual regime established by the
participants to the project.
The court's next analytic step was its most significant one.
The court particularized the economic loss policy debate for
application to the building construction circumstances involved.
Dufficy claims that it did not have an "opportunity... to bargain
directly with PSI and BRW over the risk of the harm which would
result from defective specifications and negligent project
administration." We disagree and hold that the economic loss rule
applies when the claimant seeks to remedy only an economic loss
that arises from interrelated contracts.
The economic loss rule applies between and among commercial
parties for three main policy reasons, none of which depends upon or
is limited to the existence of a two-party contract: (1) to maintain a
distinction between contract and tort law; (2) to enforce expectancy
interests of the parties so that they can reliably allocate risks and
costs during their bargaining; and (3) to encourage the parties to
build the cost considerations into the contract because they will not
be able to recover economic damages in tort.
In the context of larger construction projects, multiple parties are
often involved. These parties typically rely on a network of
contracts to allocate their risks, duties, and remedies ....
In such a contract chain, the parties do have the opportunity to
bargain and define their rights and remedies, or to decline to enter
into the contractual relationship if they are not satisfied with it.
Even though a subcontractor may not have the opportunity to
directly negotiate with the engineer or architect, it has the
opportunity to allocate the risks of following specified design plans
when it enters into a contract with a party involved in the network
of contracts. In this situation, application of the economic loss rule
encourages a subcontractor to protect itself from risks, holds the
parties to the terms of their bargain, enforces their expectancy
interests, and maintains the boundary between contract and tort
law.
The policies underlying the application of the economic loss rule to
commercial parties are unaffected by the absence of a one-to-one
contract relationship. Contractual duties arise just as surely from
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two-party

As already mentioned, the most important step in the court's
analysis was to recognize that a complex, highly developed, and
commercially coherent risk allocation relationship may exist
among participants in a construction project even though they are
not all parties to the same contracts. It may be but a slight
elaboration to say that the court implicitly held that when one
participant in a construction project seeks to recover its economic
losses from another participant a court should not look for an
independent tort duty of care without first inquiring whether the
multi-party operational structure involved has already allocated
the risk of liability at issue. If so, a court should not reallocate the
risk as a matter of tort policy if the most significant result of doing
so is to reduce the costs the structure imposes on one of the
participants.
By thoughtfully placing in context the commercial
relationships involved, the Berschauer and Dufficy cases stand
apart from the more conventional approaches of other cases in
which non-clients seek purely economic loss based on design
malpractice. In the process, those two cases begin to point the way
to a more rigorous and sophisticated analysis that courts might
adopt whenever one participant in a construction project sues for a
retrospective realignment of commercial risk allocation. The
wisdom of this approach becomes more apparent when the basis of
the claim shifts from professional negligence to the rather slippery
theory of negligent misrepresentation.
D.

Negligent Misrepresentation

Negligent misrepresentation has become the most facile tort
theory available to a construction project participant who would
recover purely economic loss from another participant. Negligent
misrepresentation draws legitimacy from the groundbreaking
decision in Glanzer v. Shepard,2 9 the significance of which this
Article has previously noted.24 ° Cardozo's 1922 analysis of the
liability of careless bean weighers radiates throughout the
negligent misrepresentation jurisprudence.24" '

238. Id. at 72 (citations omitted).
239. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
240. See supra Part II.B (examining Glanzer, an early case recognizing tort
liability for economic loss, and its progeny).
241. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, cmt. g (1977) (utilizing the
facts in Glanzer v. Shepard). Negligent misrepresentation cases arising in the
construction industry frequently cite Glanzer v. Shepard. See, e.g., Guardian
Constr., 583 A.2d at 1382; Ossining Union Free Sch. Dist., 539 N.E.2d at 93;
Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co., 222 N.E.2d 752, 755 (Ma. 1967).
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In contemporary law, the Restatement articulates the tort of
negligent misrepresentation succinctly, but with only subtle
reference to commercial context:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or
knows that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction. 242
Not only does the Restatement recognize negligent
misrepresentation as a valid theory for tort recovery, it expressly
contemplates recovery of purely economic loss,243 even in the
construction industry setting.2 44
Many cases hold that the
Restatement essentially exempts negligent misrepresentation
claims from the economic loss rule,245 or they at least imply that it

242. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552. Subsection (3) deals with
those who have a public duty to provide information and is not commonly
involved in building construction cases. Subsection (3) states: "The liability of
one who is under a public duty to give the information extends to loss suffered
by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of
the transactions in which it is intended to protect them." Id.
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B.
244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552, cmt. h, illus. 9.
245. See, e.g., Bilt-Rite Contractors, 866 A.2d at 286 (determining the

architect could be held liable for economic loss under theory of negligent
misrepresentation despite lack of privity); Hewitt-Kier Constr., Inc. v. Lemuel
Ramos & Assoc., Inc., 775 So. 2d 373, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding
architect liable to contractor for foreseeable harm to subcontractors relying on
architect's design); Jim's Excavating Serv., 878 P.2d at 254-55 (holding that
the contractor may recover purely economic losses against an engineer or
architect when design professional could foresee parties at risk in relying on
the information supplied).
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does, 4' although the availability of economic damages in other
cases seems to turn on the particular facts involved. 47
One of the earliest and most influential cases relying on
negligent misrepresentation as a basis for purely economic
damages in a construction industry case was decided in 1958 by a
federal district court applying California law." s
The court's
principal holding was that the owner's architect could be held
liable to the general contractor under the theory of the Biakanja
case if the evidence established that the architect was negligent in
reviewing concrete test results and approving pre-formed
structures (referred to as bents).249 As an alternative basis, the
court held that by approving the test reports the architect
negligently represented to the owner that the structures
conformed to the project specifications. The court reasoned:
[I]nsofar as the counterclaim alleges that the architect negligently
interpreted and construed reports of tests on the concrete and then
authorized the incorporation of the bents into the building, the
contractor in effect asserts a claim of negligent misrepresentation by
the architect, with reasonably foreseeable reliance thereon by the
contractor to the latter's detriment. This is so because authorization
to incorporate the bents into the building, given by the architect,
who is admittedly responsible for overseeing the work of the testing
laboratories and for supervising construction to assure conformity
with specifications, must be taken to imply a representation, first,
that the architect has inspected the bents and reviewed the tests
performed on the concrete of which they were made, and second,
that both the bents and the concrete therein conform to
specifications. 50
Although negligent misrepresentation claims in construction
industry cases commonly involve purely economic loss, it is

246. See, e.g., John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc. 819 S.W.2d 428, 431-34
(Tenn. 1991) (allowing a claim for economic loss under § 552); Guardian
Constr., 583 A.2d at 1385-86 (permitting a negligent misrepresentation claim
based on economic damages alone); Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Rhodes-Haverty
Partnership, 300 S.E.2d 503, 504 (Ga. 1983) (accepting rationale of § 552 and
claims for purely economic loss); Donnelly Constr., 677 P.2d at 1296-97
(allowing a negligence claim against design professional without privity of
contract).
247. See, e.g., Nat'l Steel Erection, Inc. v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 899 F.
Supp. 268, 274 (N.D. W. Va. 1995) (concluding that allowing the subcontractor
to recover from the owner's engineer "would permit it to recover benefits it was
unable to obtain in contract negotiations"); John Martin Co., 819 S.W.2d at
431 (resisting the construction manager's motion for summary judgment, the
trade contractor argued that the record supported its contention that under
the particular circumstances it had no choice other than to rely to its
detriment on information the owner's construction manager provided).
248. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 135-36.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 136.
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interesting that this seminal case addressed only whether to
recognize the tort of negligent representation and not whether it
mattered that the plaintiff suffered no physical harm.25
"'
Another relatively early case held that a surveyor retained by
a real estate developer could be held liable to a general contractor
hired by the developer to build roads based on the surveyor's
work.252 The court affirmed a directed verdict for the surveyor on
the first count, which alleged an intentional or reckless
misrepresentation because the evidence failed to support those
theories. The second count simply alleged that the surveyor was
negligent in providing measurements and plans and in setting
stakes for the road work.253 Although the plaintiff had not
characterized the surveyor's negligence "in making plans and in
placing stakes" as misrepresentations, the court concluded that
"[sluch acts are a form of representation."254 The court held that
the surveyor could be held liable for negligent misrepresentation
for negligently placed stakes that the surveyor knew the plaintiff
would rely on to establish the starting points for the road work.25
Participants in a construction project, especially those
involved in design or coordination or construction management,
frequently provide to their clients plans, inspection results,
reports, or other services that the client passes along to another
participant.256
These circumstances create the potential for
negligent misrepresentation claims in a wide variety of recurring
situations.
For example, a building purchaser who relied on inaccurate
information in an inspection report concerning the building's
condition may have a negligent misrepresentation claim against
the inspection firm even though the seller rather than the buyer
commissioned the report.257 Similarly, a trade contractor may
251. This may reflect that, especially under California tort jurisprudence,
the primary concern limiting liability is "the specter of widespread tort
liability.., and that economic loss cases lacking this feature do not receive
distinctive treatment." Rabin, supra note 25, at 1514-15.
252. Craig, 222 N.E.2d at 755.

253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 753.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 754-55.
Several cases cited in this discussion of negligent misrepresentation

illustrate. See, e.g., John Martin Co., 819 S.W.2d at 429 (holding that a
subcontractor can make a negligent misrepresentation claim against a
construction manager even absent privity); Guardian Constr., 583 A.2d at
1386 (explaining that construction companies had a valid negligent
misrepresentation claim against a design engineer because it knew the
construction companies would rely on its calculation); Donnelly Constr., 677

P.2d at 1296-97 (holding the architect could be liable for negligent
misrepresentation to a construction company who relied on the calculations

when it submitted its bid).
257. See Robert & Co. Assoc., 300 S.E.2d at 504 (emphasizing that the
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have a negligent misrepresentation claim against the owner's
construction manager who provides inaccurate information in the
course of supervising or directing the work."' Additionally, as has
already been noted, negligent misrepresentation claims are not
limited to situations involving express representations.2 "9
A
negligent misrepresentation claim based on indirect or implied
representations may have special force if the owner's architect or
engineer has extensive authority over the contractor 260 or if the
design professional's services are for the express purpose of giving
the contractor essential information.26'
In the construction
industry setting, a negligent
misrepresentation claim may prove more adaptable than claims
based on ordinary negligence and professional negligence. For
example, a negligent misrepresentation claim may succeed even
though,
aside
from
the
circumstances
involving
the
misrepresentation, no special relationship exists between the
plaintiff and the defendant that would be sufficient to support a
negligence claim.262 Moreover, an alternative count in negligent
misrepresentation frequently offers a viable companion to a
professional negligence count.2n
And a participant in a
construction project who is unable to establish a third-party
beneficiary claim based on the defendant's deficient performance
under a contract with another participant may be able to
characterize the defendant's actions as involving negligent
misrepresentations . 26
Negligent misrepresentation is also an
attractive alternative to a professional negligence claim if the
inspection firm knew the seller would use the report to encourage prospective
purchasers).
258. See John Martin Co., 819 S.W.2d at 429 (explaining that the
construction manager was responsible for providing the plans and
specifications to the subcontractors).
259. See Craig, 222 N.E.2d at 754-55 (holding that the contractor reasonably
relied on the location of survey stakes placed by the owner's civil engineer);
Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 132 (stating that the architect and
architect's consultant tested and approved pre-formed concrete structural
elements before the contractor's installation).
260. See Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. at 132 (relating that the architect
was responsible for supervising all aspects of the construction).
261. See Craig, 222 N.E.2d at 755 (concluding that the damages suffered by
a contractor for errors made by the civil engineer were recoverable).
262. See, e.g., Mosser Constr., Inc. v. W. Waterproofing Co., No. L-05-1164,
2006 WL 1944934 at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14, 2006) (stating that recovery in
a negligent misrepresentation claim is possible if there is a "sufficient nexus"
among the parties involved); Malta Constr., 694 F. Supp. at 908 (holding an
"intended beneficiary" to a contract between an engineer and subcontractor
had a right to sue for breach of that contract).
263. See, e.g., Guardian Constr., 583 A.2d at 1387 (concluding both a
negligent and negligent misrepresentation suit is possible even without privity
among the parties).
264. Id.
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defendant is not a recognized design professional or was not
necessarily functioning in that capacity.265 Additionally, a plaintiff
who sues a design professional for negligent misrepresentation
might avoid the need for expert testimony to establish a breach of
the professional standard of care, which would be essential if the
claim were based on professional negligence. 2
A 1990 Delaware case identified one aspect of the negligent
misrepresentation theory that may be especially important in
justifying recovery of economic loss whether or not purely
economic loss is available under other tort theories. 267 The court
held that a project engineer should be liable for foreseeable
economic losses if, as part of its role in designing a project, the
engineer "negligently obtained and communicated incorrect
information specifically known and intended to be for the guidance
of Plaintiffs, and if it is specifically known and intended that
Plaintiffs would rely in calculating their project bids on that
information, and if Plaintiffs rely thereon to their detriment." 68
seems to distinguish many negligent
This observation
representation situations, which involve a relatively small class of
identifiable potential plaintiffs, from cases in which tortious
The
conduct could have widespread economic consequences.
Restatement also places significance on this factor by imposing
liability on the defendant only to "the person or one of a limited
group of persons for whose benefit and guidance he intends to
supply the269information or knows that the recipient intends to
supply it."
As all of these authorities show, courts have increasingly
accepted the negligent representation theory when they have
perceived that one participant in a construction project has
reasonably and foreseeably relied on information provided by
another participant. In response to this growing risk of liability,
defendants have vigorously argued against recovery for purely
economic loss. 270 Often, the defendant or the court explicitly

265. See Presnell Constr. Managers, 134 S.W.3d at 582 (holding a
construction manager liable to contractor for supplying faulty information).
266. See generally SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at §14.06 (explaining
that in order to support a conclusion that the defendant has not performed up
to ordinary professional standards, expert testimony is generally required to
establish the professional standard).
267. GuardianConstr., 583 A.2d at 1378.

268. Id. at 1386.
269. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1977).

270. See, e.g., John Martin Co., 819 S.W.2d at 430 (describing defendant's
argument against "recovery for economic losses in the absence of privity");
Craig, 222 N.E.2d at 754-55 (discussing whether the law should allow purely
economic losses); Guardian Constr., 583 A.2d at 1381-86 (detailing the case
law behind defendant's argument against recovery because there was no
contract between the parties).
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frames the question as whether, as a policy matter, negligent
misrepresentation is an appropriate exception to whatever version
of the economic loss defense the jurisdiction has already
271
adopted.
On this question, several courts have stood firmly
against giving special treatment to negligent misrepresentation
claims."' With only a few exceptions, however, the construction
industry cases denying recovery for purely economic loss based on
negligent misrepresentation have done so primarily by invoking
somewhat mechanical
rules272 or narrow grounds unique to the
2 74
them.
before
facts
272
The Washington Supreme Court's opinion in Berschauer,
which has already been highlighted in reference to the
professional negligence theory,276 stands out because it provided
policy arguments for a restrictive response to a negligent
misrepresentation claim in the construction industry setting.
Precedent and logic required the court to acknowledge the
negligent misrepresentation theory upon which the contractor
based its claim against the project architect and to concede that
the Restatement supports recovery of economic loss in construction

271. See, e.g., Nota Constr. Corp. v. Keyes Assoc., Inc., 694 N.E.2d 401, 405
(Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (stating that negligent misrepresentation is an
exception to the economic loss doctrine); Malta Constr., 694 F. Supp. at 906
(explaining that a claim for negligent misrepresentation is an exception to the
"strict privity-economic loss rule").
272. See, e.g., Dufficy, 99 P.3d at 74-75 (holding that "contract principles
override tort principles," barring subcontractor's claim for negligent
misrepresentation); Preston v. Condon Constr. & Realty, Inc., 690 N.W.2d 885,
885 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that the economic loss doctrine applies to
consumer transactions); Nat'l Steel Erection, 899 F. Supp. at 272 (granting
summary judgment for defendant in a negligent misrepresentation claim);
Williams & Sons Erectors, Inc. v. S.C. Steel Corp., 983 F.2d 1176, 1181 (2d
Cir. 1993) (holding under New York law that there must be "privity of contract
or a relationship closely approaching it").
273. See, e.g., David Pflumm Paving & Excavating, Inc. v. Foundation Servs.
Co., 816 A.2d 1164, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2003) (stating that recovery is only
allowed if plaintiff "suffered losses in addition to his economic loss"); Fireman's
Fund Ins., 679 N.E.2d at 1199 (listing three instances in which a plaintiff
could recover: the plaintiff suffers personal injury or property damage; fraud;
and negligent misrepresentation involving information supplied in a business
transaction); Williams & Sons Erectors, Inc., 983 F.2d at 1182 (holding that
the relationship between the parties must be "so close as to approach that of
privity").
274. See IT Corp. v. Ecology & Envtl. Eng'g, 275 A.D.2d 958, 960 (N.Y. App.
2000) (explaining that a party can only recover if there is actual privity or a
relationship similar enough to be deemed equivalent to privity); Tex.
Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402, 408 (6th Cir. 1964)
(holding plaintiffs evidence did not present a proper "vehicle in which to make
a new advance in the law of torts").
275. Berschauer,881 P.2d at 993.
276. See supra notes 220-24 (providing examples and explanations on
professional negligence in the construction industry).
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industry cases.277 Nonetheless, the court identified countervailing
considerations that required limiting the contractor to its right to
recover its economic losses solely from the school district with
which it had an agreement (and with which the contractor had
already reached a settlement).
We hold that when parties have contracted to protect against
potential economic liability, as is the case in the construction
industry, contract principles override the tort principles in § 552
and, thus, purely economic damages are not recoverable ....
There is a beneficial effect to society when contractual agreements
are enforced and expectancy interests are not frustrated. In cases
involving construction disputes, the contracts entered into among
the various parties shall govern their economic expectations. The
preservation of the contract represents the most efficient and fair
manner in which to limit liability and govern economic expectations
in the construction business. Berschauer/Phillips' recovery of
economic damages is therefore limited to those damages recovered
from the District and to those assigned contractual claims that
survive this appeal. 2781
Several other courts have relied on the Berschauer analysis to
deny recovery of purely economic losses in construction industry
cases based on negligent misrepresentation, but they have not
contributed significantly to the Washington Supreme Court's
279
analysis.
Overall, influenced significantly by Section 552 of the
Restatement of Torts, the courts have more consistently approved
negligent misrepresentation than any other tort theory for
recovery of purely economic loss in construction industry cases.
What remains to be considered is how well any of the theories
resonate with the reality of commercial risk allocation in the
construction industry.

277. Berschauer,88 P.2d at 993.
278. Id. The mention of assigned contractual claims referred to the
assignment, as part of the settlement between the school district and the
contractor, of any damage claims the district had under its contracts with the
design and testing firms.
279. Dufficy, 99 P.3d at 74-75; SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Bentulett,
Stainback & Assoc., Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 683-84 (Utah 2001); Rissler &
McMurray Co. v. Sheridan Area Water Supply Joint Powers Bd., 929 P.2d
1228, 1234-35 (Wyo. 1996); see Nat'l Steel Erection, 899 F. Supp. at 272-74
(holding that contract principles override tort principles). But see Grynberg v.
Questar Pipeline Co., 70 P.3d 1, 13 (Utah 2003) (calling into doubt the
continuing significance of SME Industries).

2007]

Commercial and Economic Loss in the ConstructionContext

IV.

95

RETHINKING THE COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC LOSS
PROBLEM IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

A. Making Law in Context
Sound judicial process melds legal principles with living facts.
This is what makes the process contextual. It happens when trial
courts apply accepted legal principles to well-developed facts in
routine cases. And it also happens when appellate judges develop
new legal principles or modify existing ones in response to
changing circumstances. The law, especially tort law, demands
attention to these two variations because facts that make for a
routine case at one stage in the law's development may later come
to light under changing circumstances. In other words, it is not
enough that judges take care to decide routine cases only after the
parties have a fair opportunity to develop the facts. When a claim
seeks to expand or modify existing liability theories, courts,
especially at the appellate level, must make an adequate
assessment of the relevant facts, including the context in which
the claim arises.
Leading cases addressing the economic loss problem illustrate
this point. In the early part of the twentieth century, judges
managed tort liability through such devices as proximate cause
and privity. These accepted tort principles provided logical bases
for limiting tort liability in relatively common situations, including
those involving purely economic loss. 8 ' As changes in society
fueled a tort liability expansion, influential jurists and scholars led
a revolution in tort theory that produced more sophisticated and
discerning legal principles."8 '
The California Supreme Court expressed this phenomenon
well with its influential decision in Biakanja v. Irving.8 ' "The
determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors. . . .""' The particular
factors the court identified in that opinion provided a nonexhaustive list of considerations for courts to use in future cases to
make the policy judgment concerning tort liability. Among other
things, the Biakanja factors emphasize that modern tort theory
involves a normative assessment that takes into account many
280. See, e.g., Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 308 (holding plaintiff could not
recover because the contract was between the defendant and the owner of the
vessel, not plaintiff); Byrd, 43 S.E. at 421 (stating only plaintiffs who have a

direct contract with defendant can be compensated).
281. See generally WHITE supra note 28, at xxiii-xxviii (providing an analysis

of the changing concepts in tort law and how leading legal scholars and judges
shaped the law).

282. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal 1958).
283. Id. at 19.
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relevant circumstances.
These circumstances include the
relationship between the plaintiff and the event or transaction
involved, the relationship between the defendant's conduct and the
plaintiffs injury, and the relationship between the defendant's
conduct and the values and goals that tort law serves.2" Applying
contemporary tort policy to economic loss claims arising in
construction projects requires an exceptionally thorough
appreciation of context, especially the commercial context in which
construction activity occurs.
B. The ControllingRelevance of Interdependent
CommercialRelationships in Building Projects
Courts cannot adequately address economic loss problems in
construction cases based on a superficial perception of the building
construction industry. Contemporary building projects generate
economic loss problems having far more complex policy
implications than those that courts face when an inaccurate
weight certificate inflates the sales price of beans 285 or when an
ineptly drawn will allows the testator's property to pass to the
wrong relative. 286 Most construction projects create complex
commercial relationships among the participants that present
thorny problems nearly unique to the industry. In a common
project structure, an owner may hire an architect, who in turn
hires several engineers and other specialized design consultants
who together produce reams of design documents and information
used by many other participants who themselves enter into
multiple commercial arrangements with manufacturers, suppliers,
installers, and others.
The relationships involved in building design and
construction activities are made even more complex by the
overlapping technical activities involved. Tort standards should
invoke methodical analysis when the project requires that
designers, builders, manufacturers, suppliers, and consultants act
in concert to produce a power plant that will achieve optimum
at1i
287
efficiency, a glass atrium that will survive an earthquake, or a
roof that will withstand a hurricane288 or arctic wind gusts." °
These complex webs of interdependence may seem to be the
stuff of special relationships upon which tort theory properly

284. Id.
285. See Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 275.
286. See Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 18.
287. See CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc. v. ACEC Main, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 159,
162 (D. Me. 1992).
288. See Filmland Dev., Inc. v. Turner Constr. Co., Nos. B136497, B140556,
2002 WL 31693595, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 2002).
289. See Blake v. Hi-Lu Corp., 781 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 2001).
290. See Aleutian Constructors v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 372, 377 (1991).
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imposes duties of care.2' But which participants in a project are
so situated in relation to other participants that they should have
a duty to protect the others from certain commercial risks?
Participants in a construction project who contract with one
another rarely do so for the benefit of other participants in the
project. And each participant enters into the temporary social
compact of the project with a full understanding of the commercial
perspectives of the other participants. This is not to say that a
duty established under a construction contract never provides a
legitimate basis to impose a tort duty in favor of other participants
who are not parties to that contract. But courts should not impose
tort duties in these circumstances without thoroughly analyzing
the commercial context of construction projects. An owner hires
design professionals to serve as experts, advisors, and
representatives for the owner's specific purposes. The same owner
may hire one or more builders, manufacturers, and suppliers to
deliver a project that meets the owner's particular needs. General
contractors hire subcontractors and consultants and divide the
construction tasks among them. The design and construction
functions may be differentiated or combined in many alternative
ways. In almost all of these cases, relatively detailed documents
and specialized customs and practices establish reasonable
commercial expectations of the participants. Those contracts
reflect each participant's judgment about the costs of performance
in light of that participant's scope of responsibility and risk
exposure.
In other words, industry contracting structures are deliberate
exercises in risk and responsibility allocation. Participants price
their services based on careful analyses of the costs of
performance, including the costs of assumed risks. When courts
allocate or re-allocate risks after the fact, they risk upsetting an
important apple cart. A thorough appreciation of the relationships
involved requires an appreciation of the consensual risk allocation
process that underlies those relationships.

C. The Seductive Folly of a Rule-Based Approach
This portrait of commercial relationships in the construction
industry might suggest that purely economic losses should never
be recoverable when one participant sues another in tort. If the
industry implicitly requires the participants to allocate the
291. The court in Davidson & Jones stated: "Where breach of [an
architectural services] contract results in foreseeable injury, economic or
otherwise, to persons so situated by their economic relations, and community
of interests as to impose a duty of due care, we know of no reason why an
architect cannot be held liable for such injury. Liability arises from the
negligent breach of a common law duty of care flowing from the parties'

working relationship." 255 S.E.2d at 584.
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commercial risks of the project through their contracts, then
perhaps courts should never use tort doctrines to reallocate those
risks. In other words, perhaps sound policy requires a broad
economic loss rule for the construction industry, albeit for different
reasons than those the courts commonly give.
A rule-based approach to economic loss claims is seductive
because it promises predictability and judicial economy. It also
seems to offer a workable answer to a crucial question of tort
policy: Where should tort liability stop? A per se rule barring
purely economic loss claims supports a definite boundary line
between tort and contract. Finally, a rule that distinguishes
physical harm from purely economic harm seems to offer a more
legitimate way to regulate tort liability than the principles courts
used in the past for that purpose. In particular, the older notions
of privity and proximate cause too often barred tort recovery in
compelling cases involving physical harm,29 and the more modern
foreseeability standard is insufficient to keep tort liability
reasonably restrained. 92
These desires for predictability, regulation of unduly
widespread tort liability, and a clear boundary between tort and
contract occupy a central role in the leading cases that proclaim a
broad tort principle against purely economic loss claims. Too
often, however, those cases uncritically transfer the rationale for
the economic loss rule of products liability law into a construction
industry context. In doing so, those courts fail to recognize that a
unique commercial context justifies a rule-based approach when
manufactured products cause purely economic loss.
Taken as a whole, the line of construction industry cases that
establish a per se economic loss bar provides a striking example of
the fallacy of the transplanted category. 94 The justification for an
economic loss rule limiting the liability of product manufacturers
does not necessarily justify a similar limit on the liability of those
involved in building construction. Products liability law primarily
results from a judicial policy decision to protect consumers from
the risk of physical harm created by products, which is a risk
uniquely within the control of manufacturers and one that is
beyond any risk allocation functions that product sales
transactions can achieve. Courts that have adopted an economic
292. See supra note 42 (providing one case that used privity and proximate
cause to deny recovery for physical harm and another case that used privity as
a condition for recovery for physical harm).
293. See supra notes 56-60 (citing cases in which the court considered
foreseeability when holding that a defendant may be liable to a plaintiff in
tort, although there was no privity between the two parties).
294. See Moffatt Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37
The fallacy of the transplanted
CANADIAN B. REV. 535, 535-36 (1959).
category refers to the illogical application of a legal principle appropriate for
one context to an entirely different context. Id. at 555.
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loss bar in products liability cases have simply determined that
the same policy concerns that require aggressive protection from
the risk of physical harm do not apply when a product causes
purely economic loss. A matching result is not necessarily valid in
the case of economic risks inherent in building construction.
Applying theories that prevail outside of products liability law, a
court might well conclude that a typical construction project
inherently creates an environment of economic interdependence
that should impose a duty of care on some participants to avoid
causing economic loss to others.
Given the development of tort theory over the past hundred
years, a fixed rule barring most economic loss claims arising in the
construction industry unnecessarily immunizes an important and
risky category of human behavior. Modern tort theory and policy
provide no logical reason to preclude recovery for purely economic
loss in construction cases altogether. Moreover, the evolution of
tort law inevitably dooms a per se rule barring purely economic
loss. Even in jurisdictions that proclaim a broad economic loss
rule that extends beyond products liability claims, the exceptions
threaten to swallow the rule.29 And where the usual exceptions
are more narrowly applied, the economic loss rule may produce
illogical results in building construction cases.296
D. Findinga PrincipledApproach
There are important policy reasons to prefer a more
principled approach toward the economic loss problem in
As Part III demonstrates, the
construction industry cases.
interdependent relationships that infuse significant economic risks
into every construction project invite tort claims based on
negligent
and
malpractice,
professional
negligence,
misrepresentation. Several cases discussed in Part III also show
295. Laubmeier, supra note 4, at 235-56; see, e.g., Malta Constr., 694 F.
Supp. at 906-07 (using negligent misrepresentation as an exception to the
economic loss rule); see also Usow, supra note 4, at 1-3 (stating that Florida
courts have created numerous exceptions to the economic loss rule). For
example, in some jurisdictions a contractor who cannot recover economic loss
from the owner's architect on a professional negligence theory may
successfully recast the same claim so that it falls within a negligent
misrepresentation exception to the jurisdiction's version of the economic loss
rule. Malta Constr., 694 F. Supp. at 906-07.
296. See supra notes 171-76 (identifying construction cases that used the
economic loss rule to reach illogical results); see also Thomson, 899 S.W.2d at
420-22 (barring economic loss claims based on the defendant's negligence in
performing duties under an engineering inspection contract but permitting
economic loss claims based on the defendant's negligence in performing duties
under an engineering services contract for the same project because the
negligent inspection caused damage to the project itself, which was the subject
of that contract, but the negligent design services allegedly affected portions of
the project other than the portions the defendant designed).
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that, outside of products liability law, it is difficult to justify a bar
to recovery that is based solely on the character of the loss
suffered. But that does not necessarily mean that tort theories
should readily permit recovery of purely economic loss in
construction industry cases.
The cases simply do not provide a satisfactory framework for
addressing economic loss problems in the construction industry.
But several of them highlight some of the most relevant
considerations. Because of its special significance in expanding
tort liability, Biakanja v. Irving provides a convenient point of
departure. By openly embracing the policy function of negligence
law in that case, the California Supreme Court helped to free tort
analysis from rigid formulas. But the circumstances in which that
case arose did not require the court to employ the same degree of
sophisticated analysis that the construction industry requires.
The relationship between a notary who drafts a will and the
testator's intended beneficiary presents far clearer policy
questions than do the relationships created by even the simplest
construction project. The Biakanja factors are relevant to any
negligent infliction of economic loss claim, yet the opinion itself
provides little guidance for a claim that arises in the context of
highly structured commercial relationships, as typically exist in
building construction problems.
Another decision by the California Supreme Court, J'Aire
Corp. v. Gregory,297 shows the problem more clearly. In J'aire the
California Supreme Court applied the Biakanja factors in a
building construction context and held that a builder hired by a
landlord to improve leased premises owed a tort duty of care to the
tenant to complete the project on a timely basis. The court's
failure to express sufficient interest in the full context involved
creates considerable doubt about the wisdom of the case. The
appeal stemmed from the trial court's judgment of nonsuit of the
tenant's claim against the builder. If the court had merely held on
appeal that further factual development was required to
determine whether or not the builder owed a tort duty to the
tenant under the Biakanja factors, the case would be correct, or at
least unremarkable. But the meager facts pled were insufficient
to justify the duty that the court definitively imposed on the
builder.
Far more information than what the pleadings disclosed
would be required to know whether the holding comports with
sound tort policy. Why did the construction contract itself fail to
establish a completion date for the contractor's work? Was that a
factor in the negotiations between the landlord and the builder?
Given that the lease obligated the landlord to provide certain

297. 598 P.2d 60 (Cal. 1979).
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improvements to the tenant, should the tenant have any remedies
for delayed completion beyond those available to it under the
lease? Did the lease or applicable law limit the liability of the
landlord (a public entity) for delays in completion of the leased
space? If so, does that suggest that the tenant, as part of the
bargain, accepted the commercial risk of delay? How likely is it
that the construction contract price reflected the risk that the
court allocated to the builder? Is it reasonable to conclude that the
builder would have agreed to a contract imposing on it liability to
the tenant for construction delays without insisting on a
significant increase to the contract price? In light of the extensive
negotiations that often occur between a landlord and a tenant and
between a landlord and a builder when the leased space requires
improvements, one must wonder whether the court's holding
allowed the tenant to obtain from the builder, with whom it had no
consensual relationship, economic protection that it was unable to
secure in its negotiations with the landlord.
A Seventh Circuit opinion in a case not involving building
construction provided an especially useful example of a contextual
approach that may be relevant whenever negligent commercial
activity produces economic loss. In that case, the owner of a
cement plant sued to recover purely economic loss caused by a
tanker truck accident that blocked access to the plant.29 The court
proposed an extreme example to illustrate the importance of
deciding the case within the context in which commercial
transportation occurs on the nation's highways and streets.
At oral argument in the instant case, for example, the appellant
contended in response to a hypothetical question that a defendant
would be liable to all of the tenants in the Empire State Building
who lost business as a result of the defendant's negligence in
causing the access to the building to be closed. The appellants
argued that this result would be fair and noted that the tortfeasor
would be paid to assume that risk ....
Obviously, the price that a carrier would demand in order to
compensate for the real risk of being put out of business if sued by
even a few of the tenants in the Empire State Building would be
great. Furthermore, it is doubtful that insurance companies would
299
be willing to cover such large risks.
A contextual approach is even more important when economic
loss claims arise in construction industry cases. In the first
instance, this is because project structures commonly evidence the
participants' deliberate allocation of the key commercial risks
involved. Moreover, when two participants assess the risks
298. Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical Lab., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir.
1983).
299. Id. at 1171.

The John Marshall Law Review

[41:1

involved in their contractual arrangement, they do not necessarily
do so in a bilateral vacuum. Their assessments take place in the
context of a web of connected commercial relationships that should
reflect the roles of the multiple project participants. Participants
price their services based on the risks they assume, and they know
that the pricing and negotiation process requires that each
participant have a fair opportunity to assess its costs before
agreeing to commercial terms.
Several construction industry cases have recognized the
importance of an industry perspective toward economic loss
claims. The Virginia Supreme Court offered the following analysis
in rejecting a contractor's claim for economic loss allegedly caused
by an architect's failure to exercise due care in performing services
required by the architect's contract with the project owner: °°
The parties involved in a construction project resort to contracts and
contract law to protect their economic expectations. Their respective
rights and duties are defined by the various contracts they enter.
Protection against economic losses caused by another's failure
properly to perform is but one provision the contractor may require
in striking his bargain. Any duty on the architect in this regard is
purely a creature of contract. 301
Other courts have expressed similar concerns in construction
cases, especially when one participant in a project seeks to impose
tort liability on another participant. "Construction projects are
characterized by detailed and comprehensive contracts that form
the foundation of the industry's operations. Contracting parties
are free to adjust their respective obligations to satisfy their
mutual expectations. 31302
A federal court applying West Virginia law made a similar
point in rejecting a subcontractor's negligent misrepresentation
claim against the project supervisor retained by the owner,
reasoning that to allow the subcontractor to recover under the
circumstances involved "would permit it to recover benefits it was
unable to obtain in contract negotiations." 3 This, the court
concluded, was especially inappropriate because the subcontractor,
which had a contract with the owner's construction manager but
no contract with the project supervisor, was sophisticated and
"was well aware of the economic risks associated with its business
when it negotiated with" the construction manager.'"
300. Blake Const., 353 S.E.2d at 724-27.
301. Id. at 727.
302. Am. Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190
(Utah 1996); see also, City Express, 959 P.2d at 840 (denying recovery for
negligent misrepresentation based upon purely economic loss because
contracting parties are free to define their obligations in the contract).
303. Nat'l Steel Erection, 899 F. Supp. at 274.

304. Id.
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Two other construction industry cases already discussed at
length also provide useful examples of approaches to economic loss
problems that are sensitive to the construction industry context.
The Dufficy and the Bershauer cases 5 thoughtfully analyzed
claims brought by one project participant against another in light
of the construction industry backdrop - the "precise allocation of
risk as secured by contract"06 and the "network of agreements of
which all parties had notice that defined the commercial
relationships."307 But both opinions announced per se economic
loss rules that might be used in future cases to stifle rather than
to facilitate a comprehensive investigation of the relevant
commercial context. In other words, Dufficy and Bershauer tempt
overly broad interpretations. What those two cases either failed to
recognize or only dimly recognized is that courts should be wary of
claims to recover commercial losses arising in the construction
industry not because the law must preserve some imaginary
boundary between tort and contract or to serve some other
similarly abstract jurisprudential objective, but more simply
because courts should hold construction industry participants to
the risk allocation compact of the commercial relationships
determined by a specific project structure.
E. Too Tangled to Tort?
Two decades ago, Professor Rabin correctly argued that tort
jurisprudence does not justify or require a categorical distinction
between physical harm and economic harm. °8 At that time, he
was particularly interested in showing that cases rejecting
economic loss claims often can be "understood as a manifestation
of concern about widespread tort liability .. . .",' More recently,
Professor Rabin has observed that "the constraints imposed by the
economic loss rule do not ... reflect any single normative
principle. Correspondingly, the cases do not comprise a single
generic category guided by a unified set of underlying policy
These observations are especially
considerations ....
important to keep in mind when the economic loss problem arises
305. See supra notes 220-36 and accompanying text (providing a detailed
analysis of Dufficy and Bershauer, and explaining the holdings and the courts'
reasoning).
306. Berschauer,881 P.2d at 992.
307. Dufficy, 99 P.3d at 73.
308. See Rabin, supra note 25, at 1534-38. Professor Rabin also emphasized
the importance of considering the economic loss problem in context, although
he referred to context in a somewhat different sense than used in this Article.
Id. at 1518-21. He analyzed pure economic loss in relation to the development
of tort law as a whole, asking whether or not economic loss claims, as a
category, "warrant special treatment." Id. at 1517.

309. Id. at 1528.
310. Rabin, supra note 2, at 859.
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in the construction industry context. In construction industry
cases, the critical question often is not whether the claim
threatens unmanageably widespread liability, but whether it
improperly seeks to impose on one participant a duty to protect
another participant from a commercial risk not allocated in that
way by the consensual structure of the project. Courts should not
lightly invoke tort theories to allocate or reallocate risks that have
figured into actual commercial relationships.
Most purely economic losses in building construction cases
involve relational knots that are so entangled in consensual risk
allocation schemes that they should not be remedied under tort
theories. For reasons already discussed, however, the commercial
context of the construction industry does not necessarily require
that courts adopt a per se rule barring tort recovery of economic
loss. Rather, in construction industry cases, the courts should
recognize a commercial loss defense that reflects the consensual
context in which most building construction occurs. In effect,
sound tort theory should caution against recovery of commercial
losses in most construction industry cases, although specific
circumstances will occasionally justify recovery.3 11
V. A CONTRACTUAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMMERCIAL AND
ECONOMIC LOSSES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY

"We must view the act in its setting, which will include
the
312
implications and the promptings of usage and fair dealing."
A. Placing Commercialand Economic Loss
Claims in a ConstructionIndustry Setting
The construction industry cases that address economic loss
problems require courts to meld legal principles and facts in
specialized and intricate commercial contexts. Cases already
noted demonstrate the importance of a contextual approach for
each of the three primary tort theories commonly involved in
economic loss claims arising in the construction industry ordinary negligence, professional malpractice, and negligent
misrepresentation.
As Part III shows, courts in different
jurisdictions define or apply the negligence, malpractice, and
negligent misrepresentation tests in contrasting ways that
frequently produce conflicting results in factually similar
situations.

311. Judicial policies promoting consumer protection or renouncing
unconscionable bargains or contracts of adhesion present the most likely
rationales for allowing recovery of commercial or economic loss in construction
industry cases. See infra Part V.B.1 and note 327 and accompanying text
(discussing authorities on consumer claims and contracts of adhesion).
312. Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 276.
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When properly applied in construction industry cases, all of
the established theories should lead courts to give appropriate
weight to the industry context.
In several instances, the
differences in result from one jurisdiction to the next do not reflect
conflicting tort policies. Rather, they demonstrate that courts
using substantially similar policy principles may reach different
conclusions depending at least in part on how well they
understand the industry setting in which the claims arise. The
better reasoned opinions have recognized that when purely
economic loss claims arise in the construction industry, context is
not merely relevant; it may be the determinative factor in the
policy analysis. The question, then, is not whether the courts
should consider industry context in an economic tort case, but how
the courts can best identify and wisely weigh the pertinent
commercial considerations when the claim arises within the
building construction industry. In effect, courts must recognize
that it is more important to ask whether the loss involved is
essentially a product of commercial risk allocation than whether
the loss involves physical harm.
The proposals that follow reflect the view that meaningful,
deliberate risk allocation regularly occurs throughout the
construction industry. From this perspective, traditional contract
principles retain vitality, and respect for private contracts should
restrain courts.313 With that bias in mind, before presenting these
proposals in full, it is appropriate to anticipate objections based on
empirical scholarship that paints "a picture of contract law
diminished in its scope, distinctiveness and theoretical
grandeur."314 Commercial arrangements and disputes may often
occur in environments in which contract doctrine is "overshadowed
by reputational and other informal 'non-contractual' controls." 15
But building construction occurs within an industry heavily
influenced by sophisticated risk assessment and risk management
313. For a more extensive contractual perspective on the construction
industry, see Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 572-82, 618-22. Too much
judicial restraint, however, can produce an overly restrictive economic loss
rule that mechanically bars recovery when negligent performance of a contract
causes harm to one who is not a party to the contract. See Jay M. Feinman,
The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 813, 824
(2006) (arguing that "contract law today increasingly emphasizes abstraction
over contextualization").
314. Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or
May Not Want to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 577, 578
(2001).
See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 58 (1963) (providing a
seminal study of the gap between contract principles as perceived in the legal
academy and in society); Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract,
1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (1985) (arguing that academic contract law is not an
accurate reflection of its actual operation).
315. Galanter, supra note 314, at 578.
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strategies.3 1 Even if many participants in the industry find that
individualized, comprehensive risk allocation is impractical, the
contractual structures within which they operate reflect the
collective practices of an industry dominated by sophisticated risk
management analysis.317
Courts can only rationally resolve
economic loss problems in construction cases by placing the claims
in the context of this industry characteristic.
B. Solving Commercial and Economic Loss Problems
in the Contexts in Which They Occur
To this point, this Article has used legal theories as an
organizing device to review the commercial and economic loss
problem in the construction industry. For that reason, earlier
subparts separately considered ordinary negligence, professional
malpractice, and negligent misrepresentation. Unlike a review of
the existing status, a proposed solution to the problem should at
least begin by considering the recurring circumstances in which
the problem arises in the construction industry. Accordingly, this
Subpart initially distinguishes claims along situational rather
than theoretical grounds.
1. Residential Owners
One might expect that judicial empathy for consumers would
lead most courts to impose a duty of care on residential builders
and developers to protect home buyers from defective construction.
Indeed, those cases that rule for the homeowners sometimes
enthusiastically present a consumer protection motive.3 18
A
judicial preference for consumers is defensible, especially when a
court honestly expresses and explains it. The analysis in many of
the residential construction cases falters, however, by failing to
recognize that considerations unique to the construction industry
should at least figure into the interest balancing process. 19 Many

316. See generally BRUNER & O'CONNOR, supra note 153, §§ 7:1-:247

(analyzing risk management practices in the construction context).
317. See Contract Theory, supra note 1, at 573-75 (arguing that the

construction industry has developed "highly structured methods" to manage
risk).
318. See, e.g., Coburn, 378 A.2d at 602-03 (declining to extend builder-vendor

warranty to subsequent purchasers,

however,

extending liability for

negligence from builder-vendor relationship); Kennedy, 384 S.E.2d at 734
(holding that a homebuyer may sue builder for economic loss both under an
implied warranty theory and under a negligence theory); Cosmopolitan
Homes, 663 P.2d at 1045 (extending protection to subsequent homebuyers and
explaining that the builder is more knowledgeable and in a better position to
evaluate a home).

319. Several of the cases fail even to mention such obvious industry factors
as negotiated warranties and pricing to reflect potential liability for
negligence.

See, e.g., Oates, 333 S.E.2d at 225 (stating that the absence of
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other cases, including several recent ones, have resisted the
consumer protection instinct and held that a home buyer must rely
exclusively on contract remedies against a seller who is either a
builder or a developer. The problem with these cases is not that
they were insufficiently sensitive to consumer protection. The
problem is that many of these cases relied too much on formulistic
statements and justifications of an economic loss rule crafted and
developed primarily from products liability cases."'
Not all of the cases have missed the mark. One case that
refused to impose a tort duty on a residential builder offered this
contextual analysis in support of basing the liability of residential
builders on duties assumed under contract rather than those
imposed by tort policy:
Construction projects are characterized by detailed and
comprehensive contracts that form the foundation of the industry's
operations. Contracting parties are free to adjust their respective
obligations to satisfy their mutual expectations. For example, a
developer can contract for low-grade materials that meet only
minimum requirements of the building code. When the developer
sells those units, a buyer should not be able to turn around and sue
the builder for the poor quality of construction. Presumably the
buyer received what he paid for or he can bring a contract claim
against his seller. Meanwhile, if the developer has a problem with
the builder, he too will have a contract remedy. A buyer can avoid
economic loss resulting from defective construction by obtaining a
thorough inspection of the property prior to purchase and then by
either obtaining insurance or by negotiating a warranty
or reduction
21
in price to reflect the risk of any hidden defects.1
The wisdom of this analysis is that it tries to consider the
circumstances in which homes are built and sold. One could argue
persuasively that the court was wrong to conclude that a
residential buyer can effectively manage the risk of defective
construction by careful inspection, insurance, or negotiations. But
the court was right to weigh that possibility as a relevant factor.
Moreover, the court correctly recognized that in residential
construction, in contrast to product manufacturing, the affected
parties other than the consumer regularly rely on comprehensive
contracts to establish commercial expectations. Precisely because
individual negotiations manipulate the relationship between price

contractual privity does not affect a claim for negligence); Sewell, 371 S.E.2d
82, 85 (holding that a negligence claim may be brought by subsequent
homeowners despite lack of privity).
320. See, e.g., Prendiville,83 P.3d at 1259-60; Calloway 11, 993 P.2d at 1263.
321. Am. Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190-91. To the extent that American Towers
applies the economic loss rule of products liability law, the Utah Supreme

Court subsequently raised questions about the continuing authority of the
case. See Grynberg, 70 P.3d at 13.
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objectives and quality, a court should be cautious about imposing
its own post-negotiation construction standards.
These considerations should be especially important when a
homeowner sues the builder-seller or a subcontractor, supplier, or
consultant hired by the builder-seller. This is so because the
transaction that should establish the homeowner's expectations is
the sales transaction between the homeowner and the builder.
This is why courts inspired to protect consumers should be more
willing to do so by implying warranties into the contractual
relationship between the homeowner and the seller rather than by
imposing non-contractual obligations based on perceived special
relationships. An implied warranty theory, unlike a negligence or
strict liability approach, leaves room for individual risk allocation.
For example, implied warranty jurisprudence may allow limited
express warranties to override implied warranties, 32 and it may
even admit the possibility of a valid warranty disclaimer that is a
conspicuous and reasonable component of an actual bargained-for
exchange between the builder and the buyer. 2 Similarly, contract
warranties, including implied ones, may be assigned by the
original buyer to a subsequent purchaser of the residence
(expressly or by implication from the circumstances). In these
ways, implied warranties permit consumer protection to exist
within a contractual environment.
Especially complex considerations apply when a homeowner
sues a participant in the construction process who did not sell the
residence to the homeowner. When properly employed in these
cases, the test under contemporary tort theory involves a policy
exercise that requires a sophisticated evaluation of the context in
which these consumer claims arise. Are consumers who purchase
recently constructed homes essentially helpless to protect
Are market forces
themselves from shoddy construction?
insufficient to curb the problem? Do purchasers have adequate
remedies against their direct sellers? Do economic considerations
support imposing the risk of faulty construction on builders as a
policy matter? In these cases, courts must balance the policies in
favor of consumer protection with the commercial realties of
residential construction. It may well be sound economic policy to
hold builders to implied warranties that remain enforceable by
subsequent purchasers for a reasonable time after the home is
constructed. Also, in light of the number of thinly capitalized
homebuilders, it may be reasonable to impose liability on negligent
subcontractors whose defective work creates an immediate and
foreseeable risk of harm to the ultimate purchaser."4 But a court
322. See Carter v. Quick, 563 S.W.2d 461, 463 (1978).
323. See Bullington v. Palangio, 45 S.W.3d 834, 839 (Ark. 2001).

324. "With so much hasty construction taking place in Nevada today, I think
the better path would be to arm our home purchasers with all available

2007]

Commercial and Economic Loss in the Construction Context

109

should also be open to evidence that the risk of the defect involved
was calculated into the bargain made by either the original or
subsequent purchaser, or that a settlement of a prior owner's
claim involving the defect operated as a final adjustment. For
reasons just discussed, an implied warranty approach that
expresses the policy decision in contract notions may encourage
results that are more consistent with the realities of the
residential sales market than will the competing approaches that
completely abandon contract theory.
In summary, economic loss claims based on residential
construction require courts to consider both the need for consumer
protection and the possibility of commercial risk allocation. To the
extent that cases reflect variations in the way courts in different
jurisdictions strike the balance, inconsistency in the cases reveals
no essential flaw in the judicial process. But when courts blindly
protect consumers without considering commercial realities, they
may produce windfall recoveries and inefficient risk allocation. At
the other extreme, when they mechanically apply an economic loss
bar they may inadvertently and unjustifiably shield shoddy
construction practices.
For the same reasons that courts should be circumspect when
a residential purchaser seeks extra-contractual remedies, they
should be even more cautious about interjecting tort duties into a
contractual relationship between commercial participants in
construction projects. This observation leads to a distinction
involving commercial participants in the construction industry
that may seem arcane but that is nonetheless valid. The following
Subparts B.2 and B.3 separately consider claims involving
commercial participants that are parties to the same contract and
those that are not. While this may appear to revive the privity of
contract rules of bygone days, in fact it only seeks to give
commercial reality its due.
2.

Commercial Claims Between ContractingParties

The case for insisting on a contractual analysis of an economic
loss claim is strongest when the plaintiff and the defendant
entered into a contractual arrangement to define their commercial
relationship in reference to the project.
Claims of negligent
performance frequently emerge in disputes between contracting
commercial participants in the construction industry. In these
situations, the courts have been relatively quick to recognize that,
by resorting to negligence theory, the plaintiff is asking the court

remedies, when faced with a defectively constructed home, rather than the one
taken by the majority today." Calloway H, 993 P.2d at 1279 (Rose, C.J.,
dissenting).
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to reallocate contractual risks after the fact.325 These results
comport well with the commercial context, and they require no
special rules that turn on the nature of the harm the plaintiff
suffers.
The main exception that commonly arises involves design
malpractice claims made by a design professional's client. In this
limited circumstance courts have held that a special relationship
exits between the client and the design professional that arises
from the design services contract but that is separate from the
This corruption of the consensual relationship is
contract.
unnecessary and leads to confusion in the law. By giving due
regard to industry usage and customs, the courts could rationally
imply into every agreement for design services a professional
performance standard that would produce sensible results without
wholly transforming a contractual relationship into one governed
by tort policy.
3.

Commercial Claims Without a Direct ContractualRelationship

The most difficult economic loss questions that arise in the
construction industry - and the ones on which the cases are in
greatest discord - arise when one participant in a construction
project seeks to recover commercial loss from another participant
with whom the claimant has no direct contractual relationship.
Too many courts eagerly adopt the rationale that interdependence
in a construction project creates special relationships that justify a
duty of care under tort law. 2' The fact is that the relationships
involved may well be special in an entirely different sense. The
relationships among participants in a construction project often
reflect deliberate risk allocation strategies that affect how the
participants establish their fees, calculate their costs and profits,
and insure and otherwise manage their risks. Courts should not
easily impose on one participant a tort duty to protect another
participant from commercial loss. The critical distinction in these
cases is not whether the harm is purely economic rather than at
least partially physical; the key question is whether the claim
seeks to upset the commercial risk allocation determined by the
project's contractual structure.
Above all else, courts should make one overriding change in
how they apply tort theories to economic loss claims brought by
commercial participants in construction projects. They should
325. See, e.g., Azco Constr., 10 P.3d at 1264 (stating that a party suffering
only economic loss cannot assert a claim for negligence unless the contract
assigned a duty of care); City Express, 959 P.2d at 839-40 (limiting recovery
from a design professional to contract remedies only).
326. See supra Part III.B (demonstrating the conflicting holdings of courts
permitting recovery for economic loss under a claim of negligence and those

looking solely to the contract terms).
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examine openly and thoroughly whether a tort duty to protect
others from economic loss is consistent with the total commercial
context that the participants themselves have accepted as the
project regime. The relevant considerations are not limited to the
terms of any express contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant.
Commercial participants in construction projects
understand that each participant must be able to assess the costs
of performance. They also know that the accepted method for
transferring risk to others in the construction industry nearly
always involves at least two critical steps. First, expressly identify
the risk involved and the nature and extent of the proposed risk
allocation. Second, adopt a consensual re-assessment of the costs
associated with the risk transfer. This is not to say that all
participants have equal bargaining position, but only that even
participants with little negotiating leverage make a knowing,
deliberate, and commercial decision either to accept the project's
express risk allocation structure or not to participate in the
project. Where bargaining inequality is extreme, courts remain
free to grant
relief from unconscionable bargains and contracts of
32 7
adhesion.
Of the existing opinions, those of Bershauer and Dufficy,
which have already been reviewed extensively,"' once again may
327. With good reason, some scholars find contemporary courts too
"deferential" to adhesion contracts. See Feinman, supra note 313, at 824
(noting that transformations in contract law have led to judicial consideration
of assent when analyzing contracts of adhesion); Charles L. Knapp, Taking
ContractsPrivate: The Quiet Revolution in ContractLaw, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.

761, 788-89 (2002) (explaining how contract language and contract law have
changed and that courts give greater deference to adhesion contracts). But a
court viewing context holistically as this Article advocates would consider the
extent to which any participant in a construction project held dominant power
over any other participant. See generally Pardee Constr. Co. v. Superior
Court, 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (concluding that
contracts between residential builder and purchasers were contracts of
adhesion, and contractual waivers of jury trial and of the right to seek
punitive damages were unconscionable); Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev.
Inc., 204 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (subcontractor was not bound
by settlement agreement that was the product of economic duress). While
subcontractors often depict themselves as helpless to bargain with powerful
prime contractors, it goes too far to suggest that most construction
subcontracts are contracts of adhesion.
The bargaining positions of
subcontractors vary extensively, but even smaller subcontractors who often
feel compelled to accept the terms of form contracts benefit from the collective
influence of subcontractors' trade associations, which commonly participate in
the industry-wide discussions that produce the standard contracting
structures. See generally SWEET & SCHNEIER, supra note 2, at 607-10. See
also supra notes 313-16 and accompanying text (noting risk allocation in the
construction industry). The extent to which unequal bargaining position
prevents meaningful negotiation in the construction industry as a whole is an
interesting topic for another time.
328. See supra notes 222-38, 275-79 and accompanying text (discussing
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point the way. It should not matter whether a plaintiff who
suffered economic loss can attribute the loss to carelessness,
professional negligence, or even misinformation by a participant
on whom the plaintiff is dependent but with whom the plaintiff
has no contractual relationship. The plaintiff who opted into a
construction project decided to participate based on the express
contract or contracts to which it is a party, not based on some
unspoken social standard of commercial behavior discernable by
judges as a matter of law after the fact. As the Berschauer court
said in this situation: "The fees charged by architects, engineers,
contractors, developers, vendors, and so on are founded on their
expected liability exposure as bargained and provided for in the
contract." 329 That is, the fees are based on the project's contractual
risk allocation regime and not on non-contractual duties that
courts might impose after a risk becomes an actual cost. And the
absence of a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant does
not take the matter outside of the consensual, commercial context
of the construction project. "Contractual duties," as the Dufficy
court observed, "arise just as surely from networks of interrelated
contracts as from two-party agreements."3 °
The implicit insight of the Bershauer and Dufficy opinions is
that each project participant must price its proposal by estimating
the costs of performance, including the costs of assumed liability
for commercial losses. The project's contractual arrangements
should determine whether the participant will be liable to those
other than its direct client for commercial risks inherent in the
construction process. This approach to commercial risk allocation
in the construction industry should lead courts to sounder
decisions in the recurring factual situations in which one
participant asserts an economic loss claim against another
participant. To demonstrate this point, one need only return
briefly to the three most popular tort theories for recovering purely
economic loss in construction industry cases.
Negligent construction. A traditional negligence analysis
must ask whether policy considerations justify imposing a duty on
one participant to avoid causing commercial or purely economic
loss to another. When courts in construction industry cases
balance the factors involved in that policy, they should always
take into account the relevant industry and project context. For
purposes of a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, courts
should craft principles that invite the party defending against a
commercial or economic loss claim to allege facts or adduce
evidence that could show that a judicially imposed duty would be

Berschauer and Dufficy).
329. Berschauer,881 P.2d at 992.
330. Dufficy, 99 P.3d at 72.
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inconsistent with the project's contractual structure. The J'Aire
circumstance comes immediately to mind.331 The case was before

the court on pleadings that left open too many questions about the
relevant commercial context. On what basis could the court
conclude that the lease between the owner-landlord and the
plaintiff-tenant was an incomplete commercial basis for allocating
solely to the tenant the risk that the leased premises would not be
completed on the tenant's business schedule? Similarly, what
allegations justified imposing on the builder-defendant a duty to
the tenant to complete the leasehold improvements on a schedule
protective of the tenant's commercial interests when apparently
neither the lease nor the construction contract supported that
result? These questions do not conclusively negate the builder's
duty to the tenant, but they show that the pleadings presented an
incomplete basis for imposing that duty, and they raise the specter
of judicial tinkering with commercial bargains.
Professional negligence.

Consider

again

the

project

participant, say a general contractor, whose performance and
profit depend on the services of another participant's design
professional, say the owner's architect. If the general contractor
fails to negotiate for express contractual rights against that design
professional, courts should at least consider the possibility that in
the total circumstances of the network of commercial relationships
involved, the general contractor has made a commercially
reasonable decision to underwrite the owner's, not the architect's,
credit. Under these circumstances, established contract doctrine
and industry practice transfer the contractor's risk of defective
design to the owner.3 The contractor who is reluctant to look
exclusively to the owner's net worth if the design services prove
defective or erroneous should not expect a court to reallocate any
part of the commercial risk to the design professional. The
contractor could negotiate with the owner for third-party
beneficiary status under the design services agreement or it could
propose some other consensual form of direct access against the
design professional. This would permit the owner and its design
professional to assess and price the proposed risk transfer. As any
contractor's attorney knows, this approach would almost
invariably lead to discussions about insurance, contractual
liability limits, and other risk management techniques."33 A court
viewing the circumstances with hindsight will usually have no
basis for guessing how these commercial participants might have
331. See J'Aire, 598 P.2d at 63 (holding a builder owed a tenant of the
contracting owner a duty of care to finish a project in a timely manner).
332. United States. v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132, 135-37 (1918).
333. See Specialty Designs, supra note 1, at 170-73 (explaining how the risk
of design and defect liability can be effectively addressed through risk
management techniques).
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resolved the tricky risk allocation issues if the general contractor
had elected to put them on the negotiating table.
This is not to say that the courts should adopt a per se rule
barring tort recovery in these situations.
Exceptional
considerations may (rarely) justify a judicial reallocation of
commercial risks.
Indeed, the contextual analysis may be
especially intricate when the claim asserts negligent professional
services (or negligent misrepresentation), as is often the case when
a contractor or subcontractor suffers loss attributable to the acts
and omissions of the owner's design professional. Courts may
reasonably inquire whether, under the specific circumstances, the
contractor or subcontractor was so helplessly dependent on the
design professional that tort law should intervene to impose a duty
of care on the design professional to protect the non-client from
commercial risks. Did the design professional knowingly and
voluntarily accept a role upon which other project participants
would reasonably rely? Do concerns for safety and sound building
practices dictate that a professional negligence standard should
regulate the activities of architects and engineers that threaten
economic harm to non-client participants in the project? But these
are not the only relevant questions.
Does the commercial
structure of the project indicate that the contractor or
subcontractor made a decision to look solely to the owner to
recover commercial losses caused by the owner's design
consultants? Did the structure invite the architect to price its
services without reference to potential liability to participants
other than the owner? In light of industry customs and practices,
did the participant who suffered the commercial loss have
commercially reasonable risk management alternatives to avoid
abject reliance on the owner's design professional?
Negligent misrepresentationclaims. Most of the discussion of
professional negligence applies as well to claims of negligent
misrepresentation. While courts should (and undoubtedly will)
continue to resort to the Restatement to resolve negligent
3
misrepresentation claims involving the construction industry, 34
they should recognize that the Restatement already invites a
contextual approach. In particular, the courts should carefully
focus attention on whether, in light of the project's contractual
structure, the plaintiffs loss results from "justifiable reliance upon
the information"' 5 the defendant provided. Courts evaluating
negligent misrepresentation claims in construction industry cases
must not allow a project participant to use that doctrine as a

334. See supra Part III.D (discussing how courts treat claims of negligent
misrepresentation more favorably than other claims of negligence in economic
loss cases).
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
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subterfuge "to recover benefits it was unable to obtain in contract
negotiations.""
C. A Commercial Loss Defense for Economic Tort
Claims in the ConstructionIndustry
The core defect in construction industry cases dealing with
the commercial and economic loss problem is not simply that the
courts have usually failed to appreciate the construction industry
context in which the claims arise. The complex and sometimes
subtle realities of the construction industry are hardly subjects for
judicial notice. The tort principles that determine whether or not
purely economic loss may be recovered should require counsel to
develop the evidence to expose the actual commercial context in
which the economic loss occurred.
Under these circumstances, what construction law requires is
a commercial loss defense rather than an economic loss rule. Any
time a plaintiff asserts an economic loss claim in the construction
industry setting, tort law should recognize a defense on the ground
that the claim asserted is inconsistent with the commercial risk
allocation structure knowingly adopted by the parties. The main
function of a commercial loss defense would be to invite evidence
to show whether the risk involved figured significantly into the
commercial terms upon which the defendant made the decision to
participate in the project. Evidence concerning related contracts,
the project structure, and established industry customs and
practices should all be relevant to the defense.
VI. CONCLUSION

Current legal principles governing economic loss claims in
construction industry settings are incoherent because the
prevailing tort analysis does not give adequate attention to
industry context. Except when a consumer protection rationale
justifies a countervailing policy, courts should recognize
contractual structures that deliberately allocate liabilities arising
from interdependent relationships among construction project
participants. This analytic approach will allow the industry to
develop efficient risk management practices to govern recurring
patterns of behavior.
As the most important step in this
transition, courts should replace the overstated economic loss rule
with a commercial loss defense that will put economic torts in the
appropriate context. These same considerations should apply not
only to claims arising in the construction industry, but also to
economic loss claims presented in many other commercial
contexts.

336. Nat'l Steel Erection, 899 F. Supp. at 274.

